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Abstract
Knowledge extraction, typically studied in the classical setting, is at the heart of several cryp-
tographic protocols. The prospect of quantum computers forces us to revisit the concept of
knowledge extraction in the quantum setting.
We introduce the notion of secure quantum extraction protocols. A secure quantum ex-
traction protocol for an NP relation R is a classical interactive protocol between a sender and
a receiver, where the sender gets the instance z, witness w while the receiver only gets the in-
stance z. For any efficient quantum adversarial sender (who follows the protocol but can choose
its own randomness), there exists a quantum extractor that can extract a witness w′ such that
(z,w′) ∈ R while a malicious receiver should not be able to output any valid witness. We study
and construct two types of secure quantum extraction protocols.
• Quantum extraction protocols secure against quantummalicious receivers based on quan-
tum fully homomorphic encryption satisfying some mild properties and quantum hard-
ness of learning with errors. In this construction, we introduce a non black box technique
in the quantum setting. All previous extraction techniques in the quantum setting were
solely based on quantum rewinding.
• Quantum extraction protocols secure against classical malicious receivers based on quan-
tum hardness of learning with errors. Moreover, our construction has the property that a
malicious receiver cannot later, long after the protocol has been executed, use a quantum
computer to extract a valid witness from the transcript of the protocol.
As an application, based on the quantum hardness of learning with errors, we present a con-
struction of constant round quantum zero-knowledge argument systems for NP that guarantee
security even against quantum malicious verifiers; however, our soundness only holds against
classical probabilistic polynomial time adversaries. Prior to our work, such protocols were
known based, additionally, on the assumptions of decisional Diffie-Hellman (or other cryp-
tographic assumptions that do not hold against polynomial time quantum algorithms).
∗prabhanjan@cs.ucsb.edu
†rlaplaca@mit.edu
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1 Introduction
Knowledge extraction is auseful concept employed inmany constructionsof classical zero-knowledge
and secure two-party and multi-party computation protocols. The seminal work of Feige, Lapidot
and Shamir [FLS99] showshow to leverage knowledge extraction to construct zero-knowledgepro-
tocols. Traditional simulation-based notions necessarily require the simulator to be able to extract
the inputs of the adversaries to argue the security of secure computation protocols.
Typically, knowledge extraction is formalized by defining a knowledge extractor that given ac-
cess to the adversarial machine, outputs a trapdoor that is related to the input of the adversary.
The prototypical extraction technique employed in several cryptographic protocols is rewinding.
In the rewinding technique, the extractor, with oracle access to the adversary, can rewind the ad-
versary to a previous state to obtain more than one protocol transcript which in turn gives the
ability to the extract from the adversary. While rewinding has proven to be quite powerful, it has
several limitations [GK96]. Over the years, researchers realized the importance of circumventing
the disadvantages of rewinding and in the process, proposed new extraction techniques; a couple
of them include: (i) non black-box techniques [Bar01a]: the extractor has access to the description
of the adversary and, (ii) super-polynomial extraction [Pas03]: the extractor is allowed to run in
super-polynomial time.
Extracting from Quantum Adversaries. The prospect of quantum computers introduces new
challenges in the design of zero-knowledge and secure computation protocols. As a starting step
towards designing these protocols, we need to address the challenge of extracting from quan-
tum adversaries. So far, the only technique used to extract from quantum adversaries is quantum
rewinding [Wat09a], which has already been studied by a few works [Wat09a, JKMR06a, Unr12,
ARU14, Unr16] in the context of quantum zero-knowledge protocols.
Rewinding a quantum adversary, unlike its classical counterpart, turns out to be tricky in part
due to the no-cloning theorem. Informally speaking, the main issue with quantum rewinding is
that if the adversary uses a quantum state to generate messages in a protocol, it could potentially
perform operations that would destroy its state, thus it wouldn’t be able to rewind and answer
other queries. To do this, it would need to copy the state before generating the messages. As a
result, the existing quantum rewinding techniques tend to be "oblivious" [Unr12], to rewind the
adversary back to an earlier point, the extract should necessarily forget all the information it has
gained from that point onwards. As a result of these subtle issues, the analysis of quantum rewind-
ing turns out to be quite involved making it difficult to use in security proofs. Moreover, existing
quantum rewinding techniques [Wat09a, Unr12] poses a bottleneck towards achieving a constant
round extraction technique; we will touch upon this later.
In order to advance theprogress of constructingquantum-secure (post-quantum) cryptographic
protocols, it is necessary that we look beyond quantum rewinding and explore new quantum ex-
traction techniques.
1.1 Results
We introduce and study new techniques that enable us to extract from quantum adversaries.
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Our Notion: Secure Quantum Extraction Protocols. We formalize this by first introducing the
notion of secure quantum extraction protocols. This is a classical interactive protocol between a
sender and a receiver and is associated with a NP relation. The sender has an NP instance and
a witness while the receiver only gets the NP instance. In terms of properties, we require the
following to hold:
• Extractability: An extractor, implemented as a quantum polynomial time algorithm, can
extract a valid witness from an adversarial sender. We model the adversarial sender as a
quantum polynomial time algorithm that follows the protocol but is allowed to choose its
randomness; in the classical setting, this is termed as semi-malicious and we call this semi-
malicious quantumadversaries. Wealso require the additional guarantee that the adversarial
sender cannot distinguish whether its interacting with the honest receiver or an extractor.
• Zero-Knowledge: A malicious receiver should not be able to extract a valid witness after in-
teracting with the sender. The malicious receiver can either be a classical probabilistic poly-
nomial time algorithm or a quantum polynomial time algorithm. Correspondingly, there
are two notions of quantum extraction protocols we study: quantum extraction protocols se-
cure against quantum adversarial receiver (qQEXT) and quantum extraction protocols secure
against classical adversarial receiver (cQEXT).
There are two reasons why we only study extraction against semi-malicious adversaries, instead
of malicious adversaries (who can arbitrarily deviate from the protocol): first, the constructions
tend to be simpler and second, in the classical setting, there are works in the classical setting that
show how to leverage extraction from semi-malicious adversaries to achieve zero-knowledge pro-
tocols [BCPR16a, BKP19] or secure two-party computation protocols [AJ17].
Quantum extraction protocols are interesting even if we only had classical adversaries, as they
present a new method for proving zero-knowledge. The zero-knowledge simulator requires more
computational power than the adversaries. Allowing quantum simulators in the classical set-
ting [KK19] is another way to achieve this asymmetry between the power of the simulator and
the adversary besides the few mentioned before (rewinding, superpolynomial, or non-black box).
Furthermore, quantum simulators capture the notion of knowledge that could be learnt if a mali-
cious verifier had access to a quantum computer.
Quantum-Lasting Security. A potential concern regarding the security of cQEXT protocols is
that the classical malicious receiver participating in the cQEXT protocol could later, long after the
protocol has been executed, could use a quantum computer to learn the witness of the sender
from the transcript of the protocol and its own private state. For instance, the transcript could
contain an ElGamal encryption of the witness of the sender; while a malicious classical receiver
cannot break it, after the protocol is completed, it could later use a quantum computer to learn the
witness. This is especially interesting in the event (full-fledged) quantum computersmight become
more easily accessible in the future. First introduced by Unruh [Unr13], we study the concept of
quantum-lasting security; any quantumpolynomial time (QPT) adversary given the transcript and
the private state of the malicious receiver, should not be able to learn the witness of the sender.
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Constructions. We propose constructions of qQEXT and cQEXT protocols.
We show how to construct a constant round quantum extraction protocol secure against quan-
tum adversaries.
Theorem 1 (Informal). Assuming quantum hardness of learning with errors and a quantum fully ho-
momorphic encryption scheme (for arbitrary poly-time computations), satisfying, (1) perfect correctness for
classical messages and, (2) ciphertexts of poly-sized classical messages have a poly-sized classical description,
there exists a constant round quantum extraction protocol secure against quantum poly-time adversaries.
We first clarify what we mean by perfect correctness. For every valid public key, every valid fresh
ciphertext of a classical message can always be decrypted correctly. Moreover, we require that
for every valid fresh ciphertext, of a classical message, the evaluated ciphertext can be decrypted
correctly with probability negligibly close to 1. We note that the works of [Mah18a, Bra18a] give
candidates for quantum fully homomorphic encryption schemes satisfying both the above prop-
erties.
En route toproving the above theorem,we introduce anewnonblack extraction technique in the
quantum setting. Non black box extraction overcomes the disadvantage quantum rewinding poses
in achieving constant round extraction; the quantum rewinding employed by [Wat09a] requires
polynomially many rounds (due to sequential repetition) or constant rounds with non-negligible
gap between extraction and verification error [Unr12].
The novelty of our approach involves identifying the appropriate classical non black box ex-
traction technique and then porting it to the quantum setting; in particular, we rely upon the work
of [BKP19] who introduced a new non black box technique in the context of designing classical
protocols. For instance, it is unclear how to utilize the well known non black box technique of
Barak [Bar01b]; at a high level, the idea of Barak [Bar01b] is to commit to the code of the verifier
and then prove using a succinct argument system that either the instance is in the language or it
has the code of the verifier. In our setting, the verifier is a quantum circuit which means that we
would require succinct arguments for quantum computations which we currently don’t knowhow
to achieve.
We also present a construction of quantum extraction protocols secure against classical adversaries
(cQEXT). This result is incomparable to the above result; on one hand, it is a weaker setting but on
the other hand, the security of this construction can solely be based on the hardness of learning
with errors while the above result requires stronger assumptions.
Theorem 2 (Informal). Assuming quantum hardness of learning with errors, there exists a constant round
quantum extraction protocol secure against classical PPT adversaries and satisfying quantum-lasting secu-
rity.
Ourmain idea is to turn the “test of quantumness" protocol introduced in [BCM+18] into a quantum
extraction protocol; en route, we use cryptographic tools to achieve this. In fact, our techniques are
general enough that it might be useful to turn any protocol that can verify a quantum computer
versus a classical computer into a quantum extraction protocol secure against classical adversaries.
In more detail, we use a cryptographic protocol that releases the witness to the receiver if and only
if the receiver has passed the test of quantumness.
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Application: Constant Round QZK for NP with Classical Soundness. As an application, we
show how to construct constant quantum zero-knowledge argument systems secure against quan-
tum verifiers based on quantum hardness of learning with errors; however, the soundness is still
against classical PPT adversaries. Previously, no such result was known1.
Theorem3 (Constant RoundQuantumZKwithClassical Soundness; Informal). Assuming quantum
hardness of learning with errors, there exists a constant round black box quantum zero-knowledge system with
negligible soundness against classical PPT algorithms.
1.2 Technical Overview
Quantum extraction with security against classical receivers: Overview. As mentioned earlier,
our main idea is to turn the "test of quantumness" from [BCM+18] into an extraction protocol. Our
starting point is a noisy trapdoor claw-free function (NTCF) family [Mah18a, Mah18b, BCM+18],
parameterized by key spaceK , input domainX and output domainY. Using a key k ∈ K , NTCFs
allows for computing the distributions, denoted by fk,0(x) ∈ Y and fk,1(x) ∈ Y 2, where x ∈ X.
Using a trapdoor td associated with a key k, any y in the support of fk,b(x), can be efficiently
inverted to obtain x. Moreover, there are "claw" pairs (x0 , x1) such that fk,0(x0) outputs the same
distribution as fk,1(x1). Roughly speaking, the security property states that it is computationally
hard even for a quantum computer to simultaneously produce y ∈ Y, values (b , xb) and (d , u) such
that fk,b(xb)  y and 〈d , J(x0)⊕ J(x1)〉  u, where J(·) is an efficienctly computable injective function
mapping X into bit strings. What makes this primitive interesting is its quantum capability that
we will discuss when we recall below the test of [BCM+18].
Using NTCFs, [BCM+18] devised the following test: the classical verifier, who wants to test
whether the server its interacting with is quantum or classical, first generates a key k along with
a trapdoor td associated with a noisy trapdoor claw-free function (NTCF) family. It sends k to the
server who responds back with y ∈ Y. Now, the classical verifier can ask the server to show either
a pre-image xb along with bit b such that fk,b(xb)  y OR a vector d along with bit u such that
〈d , J(x0) ⊕ J(x1)〉  u. Intuitively, since the server does not know, at the point when it sends y,
whether it will be queried for (b , xb) or (d , u), by the security of NTCFs, it can only answer one of
the queries. While the quantum capability of NTCFs allows for a quantum server to maintain a
superposition of a claw at the time it sent y and depending on the querymade by the verifier it can
then perform the appropriate quantum operations to answer the verifier; thus it will always pass
the test.
A natural attempt to achieve extraction is the following: the sender takes the role of the client
and the receiver takes the role of the server and if the test passes, the sender sends the witness to
the receiver. This solution guarantees zero-knowledge against classical receivers. To extract, we
exploit the quantumcapability ofNTCFs topass the test and thusobtain thewitness. Unfortunately,
a semi-malicious sender can distinguish whether its interacting with a honest classical reciever or
an extractor. There are two issues to solve here: (i) first, the sender should not know if the receiver
1It is conceivable that existing constant round zero-knowledge protocols can be instantiated with quantum-insecure
assumptions (such as DDH) and additionally quantum hardness of learning with errors to achieve the same result.
However, our result solely relies upon the quantum hardness of learning with errors.
2The efficient implementation of f only approximately computes f and we denote this by f ′. We ignore this detail
for now.
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passed the test or not (the classical receiver will never pass the test) and, (ii) second, the sender
should not know whether the receiver obtained the witness.
A first attempt to tackle both of these issues is to use a secure two party computation protocol
where only the receiver receives the output; we later instantiate this with secure function eval-
uation [GHV10, BCPR16a] that guarantees security against quantum adversaries. The extraction
protocol proceeds as follows: the sender sends key k and the receiver responds back with y ∈ Y.
The sender then sends the challenge bit w. Instead of the receiver answering with either (b , xb) or
(d , u); it inputs this to the two party secure computation protocol. The sender, on the other hand,
inputs the witness w along with trapdoor td associated with k. The functionality associated with
the protocol checks if (b , xb) is valid if w  0 or if (d , u) if w  1. If so, it outputs the witness. This
ensures that the sender does not know whether the test passed or not and at the same time, the
extractor receives the witness since it does pass the test. In fact, we can formalize this argument
and show that indeed, extractability is satisfied. To argue zero-knowledge, we need to rely upon
the security property of NTCFs which suggest that we need to ability to extract a valid (b , xb) and
a valid (d , u); since the receiver inputs these values only into the two-party secure computation
protocol, it would seem that we need the ability to extract from this protocol. However, the instan-
tiation of the two-party secure computation protocolwe use does not guarantee efficient extraction.
Thus, we circumvent this problem by adding an quantum-secure extractable commitment before
the secure two-party computation protocol begins. The receiver instead of feeding (b , xb) or (d , u)
directly into the two-party protocol, it commits using an extractable commitment scheme [PW09];
an extractable commitment allows for a rewinding extractor to extract from the committer. This en-
ables the zero-knowledge simulator to be able to extract both (b , xb) and (d , u) using an extractable
commitment scheme if indeed the classical receiver passes the test andwe use this to contradict the
security of NTCFs. Otherwise, if the test did not pass, we can invoke the security of the two-party
protocol to argue that the receiver never receives the witness. There are a couple of issues that
we defer to the technical sections: firstly, a classical adversary can pass the test of [BCM+18] with
probability 1/2 but we require that the classical adversary passes it with only negligible probabil-
ity and secondly, we would need an extratable commitment scheme that is quantum secure; we
instantiate the construction of extractable commitment scheme of [PW09] with perfectly binding
commitments that satisfies computational hiding property against quantum adversaries.
QZK with classical provers. We go from cQEXT to quantum zero-knowledge argument with
classical verifier by the FLS trick [FLS99]. The argument systemhas 2 phases: (1) prover and verifier
engage in a cQEXT protocol, with the prover taking the role of the receiver and the verifier that of
the sender, (2) prover and verfier engage in awitness indistinguishable (WI) proof systemprotocol.
In the WI phase, instead of showing that z ∈ L, the prover will show a statement of the form (z ∈
L)∨(td′  td), where td is a trapdoor that can be extracted from the verifier in the cQEXT protocol.
BY security of cQEXT, the adversarial classical prover cannot find the trapdoor td, so it will not be
able to prove anything in the WI round unless it has a witness to the statement z ∈ L. However, a
quantum simulator can first extract td from the cQEXT protocol, and then use the trapdoor as the
witness in the WI rounds.
To implement this idea, we need to deal with a possibly malicious sender that engaged in the
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cQEXT protocol, and not just a semi-malicious one. To do this, we again use extractable commit-
ments after the cQEXT protocol is completed, in order for the prover to commit to the witness that
it will use in the WI. After this commitment is sent, the verifier is required to reveal all the random
coins it used in the cQEXT, so that the prover can check that the verifier behaved honestly in the
cQEXT. If this is indeed the case, then the prover proceeds with the WI stage, othwerwise it aborts.
The malicious verifier could try aborting in the cQEXT protocol, but our construction satisfies a
stronger extractability property: a semi-malicious sender cannot detect if it is interacting with an
extractor or a verifier even if it is allowed to abort. If the verifier aborts in the cQEXT, then the sim-
ulator would abort the same way that the honest prover would. On the other hand, if the verifier
completes the protocol, it will have to reveal the randomcoins of the cQEXT protocol. At this point,
both the simulator and the prover can abort if the verifier does not provide valid random coins.
Quantum extraction with security against quantum receivers: Overview. To construct a quan-
tum extraction protocol secure against quantum receivers (qQEXT), we consider a fully homomor-
phic encryption qFHE scheme3 having that allows for public homomorphic evaluation of quantum
circuits. For the current discussion, we assume that qFHE is 2-circular insecure (we show later
how to replace this with lockable obfuscation): that is, given qFHE.Enc(PK1 , SK2) (i.e., encryption
of SK2 under PK1), qFHE.Enc(PK2, SK1), where (PK1 , SK1) and (PK2, SK2) are independently gen-
erated public key-secret key pairs, we can recover SK1 and SK2. Using this, we attempt to construct
qQEXT protocols as follows:
• The sender,on input instance zandwitnessw, sends three ciphertexts: CT1 ← qFHE.Enc(PK1,
td), CT2 ← qFHE.Enc(PK1,w) and CT3 ← qFHE.Enc(PK2, SK1).
• The receiver sends td′.
• If td′  td then the sender outputs SK2.
A quantum extractor with non black box access to the private (quantum) state of S, after receiving
CT1,CT2 and CT3, encrypts the private (quantum) state and homomorphically evaluates S on CT1
and the result is qFHE.Enc(PK1 , SK2). Now, that the extractor has both qFHE.Enc(PK1, SK2) and
qFHE.Enc(PK2, SK1), it can recover SK1 , SK2 using the 2-circular insecurity of qFHE. Now it can
decrypt CT1 to recover the witness w! This approach sidesteps the quantum rewinding issues
mentioned earlier, as we never require the sender to rewind to a previous state in order to recover
the witness.
The ability that the extractor recovers the witness is not alone sufficient; we need to argue that
the transcript generated by the extractor is indistinguishable from the one generated during the
interaction of the sender and the honest receiver. However, the transcript generatedby the extractor
is encrypted under the public key PK1 of qFHE. Luckily, the extractor does recover SK1 and thus,
can decrypt the encrypted final state of the sender to obtain the transcript of the protcol4. This still
does not guarantee the indistinguishability of transcripts generated by the extractor and the the
transcripts generated by the honest receiver. This is because, the transcript output by the extracor
3Recall that a classical FHE scheme [G+09, BV14] allows for publicly evaluating an encryption of a message x using
a circuit C to obtain an encryption of C(x).
4We assume that without loss of generality, the final state of the sender contains the transcript of the protocol.
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contains SK2 as the third message but not the one generated by the honest receiver. In particular,
we need a mechanism where the sender does not know whether the receiver received SK2 or not.
We already encountered a similar issue when we were devising cQEXT protocols; we solved the
earlier issue using secure two-party computation (instantiated using secure function evaluation)
andwe use the same solution here aswell. Instead of the receiver sending td′ directly toS, it instead
feeds this into the two-party protocol which checks if td′  td and if so releases SK2 to the receiver.
That is, we have the following modified template.
• The sender,on input instance zandwitnessw, sends three ciphertexts: CT1 ← qFHE.Enc(PK1,
td), CT2 ← qFHE.Enc(PK1,w) and CT3 ← qFHE.Enc(PK2, SK1).
• The sender and the receiver executes a secure two-party computation protocol, where the
receiver feeds td′ and the sender feeds in (td,w). After the protocol finishes, the receiver
recoversw if td′  td.
We canargue that this still allows for extraction – the extractor nowcomputes the two-partyprotocol
homomorphically – moreover, the secure computation protocol guarantees indistinguishability of
the transcripts.
Arguing zero-knowledge involves more challenges: the adversarial receiver could "maul" the
ciphertext it receives in the first round into themessages of the secure two-party computationproto-
col. To prevent this, we require the receiver to commit to td′ in parallel with the secure computation
protocol and furthermore, the randomness used in this commitment is committed even before it
sees the first message. Using this, we demonstrate a quantum simulator that demonstrates the
quantum zero-knowledge property of the protocol.
While the above protocol is a candidate for quantum extraction protocol secure against quan-
tum receivers; it is still unsatisfactory sincewe assume a quantumFHE scheme satisfying 2-circular
insecurity.We show how to replace 2-circular insecure QFHE with any QFHE scheme (satisfying
some mild properties already satisfied by existing candidates) and lockable obfuscation for clas-
sical circuits. A lockable obfuscation scheme is an obfuscation scheme for a specific class of func-
tionalities called compute-and-compare functionalities; a compute-and-compare functionality is
parameterized by C, α (lock), β such that on input x, it outputs β if C(x)  α. As long as α is
sampled uniformly at random and independently of C, lockable obfuscation completely hides the
circuit C, α and β. The idea to replace 2-circular insecure QFHEwith lockable obfuscation is as fol-
lows: obfuscate the circuit, with secret key SK2, ciphertext qFHE.Enc(SK2, r) hardwired, that takes
as input qFHE.Enc(PK1 , SK2), decrypts it to obtain SK′2, then decrypts qFHE.Enc(SK2, r) to obtain
r′ and outputs SK1 if r′  r. If the adversary does not obtain qFHE.Enc(PK1, SK2) then we can first
invoke the security of lockable obfuscation to remove SK1 from the obfuscated circuit and then it
can replace qFHE.Enc(PK1,w) with qFHE.Enc(PK1 ,⊥). The idea of using fully homomorphic en-
cryption along with lockable obfuscation to achieve non black box extraction was introduced, in
the classical setting, by [BKP19].
Unlike our cQEXT construction, the non black box technique used for qQEXT does not directly
give us a constant round quantum zero-knowledge protocol for NP. This is because an adversarial
verifier that aborts can distinguish between the extractor or the honest prover (receiver in qQEXT).
The main issue is that the extractor runs the verifier homomorphically, so it cannot detect if the
verifier aborted at any point in the protocol without decrypting. But if the verifier aborted, the
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extractorwouldn’t be able to decrypt in the first place – it could rewind but then this would destroy
the initial quantum auxiliary state.
1.3 Related Work
Quantum Rewinding. Watrous [Wat09b] introduced quantum analogue of the rewinding tech-
nique. Later, Unruh [Unr12] introduced yet another notion of quantumrewindingwith thepurpose
of constructing quantum zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge. Unruh’s rewinding does have ex-
tractability, but it requires that the underlying protocol satisfy strict soundness. Furthermore, the
probability that the extractor succeeds is not negligibly close to 1. The work of [ARU14] shows that
relative to an oracle, many classical zero-knowledge protocols are quantum insecure, and that the
strict soundness condition from [Unr12] is necessary in order for a sigma protocol to be a quantum
proofs of knowledge.
Quantum and Classical Zero-Knowledge. Zero-knowledge against quantum adversaries was
first studied by Watrous [Wat09b]. He showed how the GMW protocol [GMW86] for graph 3-
colorability is still zero-knowledge against quantum verifiers. Other work [HKSZ08, CCKV08,
JKMR06b, Kob08, Mat06, Unr12] has extended the study of classical protocols that are quantum
zero-knowledge, andmore recently, Broadbent et al. [BJSW16] extended thenotionof zero-knowledge
to QMA languages. By using ideas from [Mah18b] to classically verify quantum computation, the
protocol in [BJSW16]was adapted to obtained classical argument systems for quantumcomputation
in [VZ19]. All known protocols, with non-negligible soundness error, take non-constant rounds.
On the other hand, zero knowledge proof and argument systems have been extensively studied
in classical cryptography. In particular, a series of recent works [BCPR16b, BBK+16, BKP18, BKP19]
resolved the round complexity of zero knowledge argument systems.
2 Preliminaries
We denote the security parameter by λ. We denote (classical) computational indistiguishability of
two distributionsD0 and D1 by D0 ≈c,ε D1. In the case when ε is negligible, we drop ε from this
notation.
Languages and Relations. A languageL is a subset of {0, 1}∗. A relation R is a subset of {0, 1}∗×
{0, 1}∗. We use the following notation:
• Suppose R is a relation. We define R to be efficiently decidable if there exists an algorithm A
and fixed polynomial p such that (x , w) ∈ R if and only if A(x , w)  1 and the running time
of A is upper bounded by p(|x | , |w |).
• Suppose R is an efficiently decidable relation. We say that R is a NP relation if L(R) is a NP
language, where L(R) is defined as follows: x ∈ L(R) if and only if there exists w such that
(x , w) ∈ R and |w | ≤ p(|x |) for some fixed polynomial p.
9
2.1 Learning with Errors
In this work, we are interested in the decisional learningwith errors (LWE) problem. This problem,
parameterized by n , m , q , χ, where n , m , q ∈ N, and for a distribution χ supported over Z is to
distinguish between the distributions (A,As+e) and (A, u), whereA $←− Zm×nq , s
$←− Zn×1q , e
$←− χm×1
and u← Zm×1q . Typical setting of m is n log(q), but we also consider m  poly(n log(q)).
We base the security of our constructions on the quantum hardness of learning with errors
problem.
2.2 Notation and General Definitions
For completeness, we present some of the basic quantum definitions, for more details see [NC02].
Quantum states and channels. LetH be any finite Hilbert space, and let L(H) : {E : H →H}
be the set of all linear operators fromH to itself (or endomorphism). Quantum states overH are
the positive semidefinite operators in L(H) that have unit trace. Quantum channels or quantum
operations acting on quantum states overH are completely positive trace preserving (CPTP) linear
maps from L(H) to L(H ′)whereH ′ is any other finite dimensional Hilbert space.
A state over H  C2 is called a qubit. For any n ∈ N, we refer to the quantum states over
H  (C2)⊗n as n-qubit quantum states. To perform a standard basis measurement on a qubit
means projecting the qubit into {|0〉 , |1〉}. A quantum register is a collection of qubits. A classical
register is a quantum register that is only able to store qubits in the computational basis.
A unitary quantum circuit is a sequence of unitary operations (unitary gates) acting on a fixed
number of qubits. Measurements in the standard basis can be performed at the end of the unitary
circuit. A (general) quantum circuit is a unitary quantum circuit with 2 additional operations: (1) a
gate that adds an ancilla qubit to the system, and (2) a gate that discards (trace-out) a qubit from the
system. A quantum polynomial-time algorithm (QPT) is a uniform collection of quantum circuits
{Cn}n∈N.
Quantum Computational Indistinguishability. When we talk about quantum distinguishers,
we need the following definitions, which we take from [Wat09b].
Definition 4 (Indistinguishable collections of states). Let I be an infinite subset I ⊂ {0, 1}∗, let p : N→
N be a polynomially bounded function, and let ρx and σx be p(|x |)-qubit states. We say that {ρx}x∈I and
{σx}x∈I are quantum computationally indistinguishable collections of quantum states if for every
QPT E that outputs a single bit, any polynomially bounded q : N → N, and any auxiliary q(|x |)-qubits
state ν, and for all x ∈ I, we have thatPr [E(ρx ⊗ ν)  1] − Pr [E(σx ⊗ ν)  1] ≤ ǫ(|x |)
for some negligible function ǫ : N→ [0, 1]. We use the following notation
ρx ≈Q ,ǫ σx
and we ignore the ǫ when it is understood that it is a negligible function.
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Definition 5 (Indistinguishability of channels). Let I be an infinite subset I ⊂ {0, 1}∗, let p , q : N→ N
be polynomially bounded functions, and let Dx , Fx be quantum channels mapping p(|x |)-qubit states to
q(|x |)-qubit states. We say that {Dx}x∈I and {Fx}x∈I are quantum computationally indistinguishable
collection of channels if for every QPT E that outputs a single bit, any polynomially bounded t : N→ N,
any p(|x |) + t(|x |)-qubit quantum state ρ, and for all x ∈ I, we have thatPr [E ((Dx ⊗ Id)(ρ))  1] − Pr [E ((Fx ⊗ Id)(ρ))  1]  ≤ ǫ(|x |)
for some negligible function ǫ : N→ [0, 1]. We will use the following notation
Dx(·) ≈Q ,ǫ Fx(·)
and we ignore the ǫ when it is understood that it is a negligible function.
Interactive Models. We model an interactive protocol between a prover, Prover, and a verifier,
Verifier, as follows. There are 2 registers RProver and RVerifier corresponding to the prover’s and the
verifier’s private registers, aswell as amessage register,RM, which is usedby bothProver andVerifier
to sendmessages. In other words, both prover and verifier have access to the message register. We
denote the size of a register R by |R| – this is the number of bits or qubits that the register can
store. We will have 2 different notions of interactive computation. Our honest parties will perform
classical protocols, but the adversaries will be allowed to performquantumprotocolswith classical
messages.
1. Classical protocol: An interactive protocol is classical if RProver, RVerifier, and RM are classical,
and Prover and Verifier can only perform classical computation.
2. Quantum protocol with classical messages: An interactive protocol is quantum with clas-
sical messages if either one of RProver or RVerifier is a quantum register, and RM is classical.
Prover and Verifier can perform quantum computations if their respective private register is
quantum, but they can only send classical messages.
When a protocol has classical messages, we can assume that the adversarial party will also send
classical messages. This is without loss of generality, because the honest party can enforce this
condition by always measuring the message register in the computational basis before proceeding
with its computations.
Non Black-Box Access. Let S be a QPT party (e.g. either prover or verifier in the above descrip-
tions) involved in specific quantum protocol. In particular, S can be seen as a collection of QPTs,
S  (S1, ..., Sℓ), where ℓ is the number of rounds of the protocol, and Si is the quantum operation
that S performs on the ith round of the protocol.
We say that a QPT Q has non black-box access to S, if Q has access to an efficient classical de-
scription for the operations that S performs in each round, (S1, ..., Sℓ), as well as access to the initial
auxiliary inputs of S.
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Interaction Channel. For a particular protocol (Prover, Verifier), the interaction between Prover
and Verifier on input z induces a quantum channel Ez acting on their private input states, ρProver
and σVerifier. We denote the view of Verifier when interacting with Prover by
ViewVerifier
(〈
Prover
(
z, ρProver
)
, Verifier (z, σVerifier)
〉)
,
and this view is defined as the verifiers output. Specifically,
ViewVerifier
(〈
Prover
(
z, ρProver
)
, Verifier (z, σVerifier)
〉)
: TrRProver
[Ez (ρProver ⊗ σVerifier) ] .
From the verifier’s point of view, the interaction induces the channel Ez,V(σ)  Ez(σ ⊗ ρProver) on
its private input state.
2.3 Perfectly Binding Commitments
A commitment scheme consists a classical PPT algorithm5 Comm that takes as input security pa-
rameter 1λ , input message x and outputs the commitment c. There are two properties that need
to be satisfied by a commitment scheme: binding and hiding. In this work, we are interested in
commitment schemes that are perfectly binding and computationally hiding; we define both these
notions below. We adapt the definition of computational hiding to the quantum setting.
Definition 6 (Perfect Binding). A commitment scheme Comm is said to be perfectly binding if for every
security parameter λ ∈ N, there does not exist two messages x , x′ with x , x′ and randomness r, r′ such
that Comm(1λ , x; r)  Comm(1λ , x′; r′).
Definition 7 (Quantum-Computational Hiding). A commitment scheme Comm is said to be computa-
tionally hiding if for sufficiently large security parameter λ ∈ N, for any two messages x , x′, the following
holds: {
Comm
(
1λ , x
)}
≈Q
{
Comm
(
1λ , x′
)}
Instantiation. A construction of perfectly binding non-interactive commitments was presented
in the works of [GHKW17, LS19] assuming the hardness of learning with errors. Thus, we have the
following:
Lemma 8 ([GHKW17, LS19]). Assuming the quantum hardness of learning with errors, there exists a
construction of perfectly binding quantum-computational hiding non-interactive commitment schemes.
2.4 Noisy Trapdoor Claw-Free Functions
Noisy trapdoor claw-free functions is a useful tool in quantumcryptography. Most notably, they are
a key ingredient in the construction of certifiable randomness protocols [BCM+18], classical client
quantum homomorphic encryption [Mah18a], and classifal verification of quantum computation
[Mah18b]. We present the formal definition directly from [BCM+18].
5Typically, commitment schemes are also associated with a opening algorithm; we don’t use the opening algorithm
in our work.
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Definition 9 (Noisy Trapdoor Claw-Free Functions). Let X and Y be finite sets, let DY be the set of
distributions overY, and letK be a finite set of keys. A collection of functions { fk,b : X → DY}k∈K ,b∈{0,1}
is noisy trapdoor claw-free if
• (Key-TrapdoorGeneration): There is a PPTGen(1λ) to generate a key and a corresponding trapdoor,
k, tdk ← Gen(1λ).
• For all k ∈ K
– (Trapdoor): For all b ∈ {0, 1}, and any distinct x , x′ ∈ X, we have that Supp( fk,b(x)) ∩
Supp( fk,b(x′))  ∅. There is also an efficient deterministic algorithm Inv, that for any y ∈
Supp( fk,b(x)), outputs x ← Inv(tdk , b , y).
– (Injective Pair): There exists a perfect matching Rk ⊆ X × X such that fk,0(x0)  fk,1(x1) if
and only if (x0, x1) ∈ Rk
• (Efficient Range Superposition): For all k ∈ K and b ∈ {0, 1}, there exists functions f ′
k,b
: X →
DY such that the following holds.
– For all (x0 , x1) ∈ Rk, and all y ∈ Supp( f ′k,b(xb)), the inversion algorithm still works, i.e.
xb ← Inv(tdk , b , y) and xb⊕1 ← Inv(tdk, b ⊕ 1, y).
– There is an efficient deterministic checking algorithm Chk : K × {0, 1} × X ×Y → {0, 1} such
that Chk(k, b , x , y)  1 iff y ∈ Supp( f ′
k,b
(x))
– For every k ∈ K and b ∈ {0, 1},
E
x←X
(
H2
(
fk,b(x), f ′k,b(x)
))
≤ µ(λ)
for some negligible function µ, and where H2 is the Hellinger distance.
– For any k ∈ K and b ∈ {0, 1}, there exists an efficient way to prepare the superposition
1√
|X|
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
√
f ′
k,b
(x)(y)|x〉 |y〉
• (Adaptive Hardcore Bit): for all keys k ∈ K , for some polynomially bounded w : N → N, the
following holds.
– For all b ∈ {0, 1} and for all x ∈ X there exists a setGk,b ,x ⊆ {0, 1}w(λ), s.t. Pr
d←{0,1}w(λ)
[
d < Gk,b ,x
] ≤
negl(λ). Furthermore, membership in Gk,b ,x can be checked given tk, k, b and x.
– There is an efficiently computable injection J : X → {0, 1}w(λ), that can be inverted efficiently
in its range, and for which the following holds. Let
Hk :
{(b , xb , d , d · (J(x0) ⊕ J(x1))) |b ∈ {0, 1}, (x0 , x1) ∈ Rk , d ∈ Gk,0,x0 ∩ Gk,1,x1}
Hk : {(b , xb , d , c) |(b , x , d , c ⊕ 1) ∈ Hk}
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For any QPTA there is a negligible function µ s.t. Prk,tdk [A(k) ∈ Hk] − Prk,tdk
[
A(k) ∈ Hk
] ≤ µ(λ)
Instantiation. The work of [BCM+18] presented a construction of noisy trapdoor claw-free func-
tions from learning with errors.
2.5 Quantum Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Quantum Homomorphic Encryption schemes have the same syntax as traditional classical homo-
morphic encryption schemes, but are extended to support quantum operations and to allow plain-
texts and ciphertexts to be quantum states. We take our definition directly from [BJ15].
Definition 10. Aquantum fully homomorphic encryption scheme is a tuple ofQPT qFHE  (Gen, Enc,Dec, Eval)
satisfying
• qFHE.Gen(1λ): outputs a a public and a secret key, (PK, SK), as well as a quantum state ρevk), which
can serve as an evaluation key.
• qFHE.Enc(PK, ·) : L(M) → L(C): takes as input a qubit ρ and outputs a ciphertext σ
• qFHE.Dec(SK, ·) : L(C) → L(M): takes a quantum ciphertext σ in correct, and outputs a qubit ρ
in the message space L(M).
• qFHE.Eval(E , ·) : L(Revk ⊗ C⊗n) → L(C⊗m): takes as input a quantum circuit E : L(C⊗n) →
L(C⊗m), and a ciphertext in L(C⊗n) and outputs a ciphertext in L(C⊗m), possibly consuming the
evaluation key ρevk in the proccess.
Semantic security and compactness are defined analogously to the classical setting, and we defer
to [BJ15] for a definition. We require an qFHE scheme to satisfy the following properties.
(Perfect) Correctness of classical messages. We require the following properties to hold: for
every quantum circuit E acting on ℓ qubits, message x, every r1 , r2 ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ),
• Pr[x ← qFHE.Dec(SK, qFHE.Enc(PK, x)) : (PK, SK) ← qFHE.Gen(1λ)]  1
• Pr[qFHE.Dec(SK, qFHE.Eval(PK,CT))] ≥ 1−negl(λ), for somenegligible function negl, where:
(1) (PK, SK) ← qFHE.Setup(1λ ; r1) and, (2) σ ← qFHE.Enc(PK, x; r2). The probability is de-
fined over the randomness of the evaluation procedure.
Instantiation. The works of [Mah18a, Bra18b] give lattice-based candidates for quantum fully
homomorphic encryption schemes; we currently do not know how to base this on learning with
errors alone6. There are two desirable propertiess required from the quantum FHE schemes and
the works of [Mah18a, Bra18b] satisfy both of them. We formalize them in the lemma below.
6Brakerski [Bra18b] remarks that the security of their candidate can be based on a circular security assumption that is
also used to argue the security of existing constructions of unbounded depthmulti-key FHE [CM15, MW16, PS16, BP16].
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Lemma11 ([Mah18a, Bra18b]). There is a quantum fully homomorphic encryption scheme that satisfies: (1)
perfect correctness of classical messages and, (2) ciphertexts of classical poly-sized messages have a poly-sized
classical description.
2.6 Quantum-Secure Function Evaluation
As a building block in our construction,we consider a secure function evaluation protocol [GHV10]
for classical functionalities. A secure function evaluationprotocol is a twomessage twoparty secure
computation protocol; we designate the parties as sender and receiver (who receives the output of
the protocol). Unlike prior works, we require the secure function evaluation protocol to be secure
against polynomial time quantum adversaries.
Security. We requiremalicious (indistinguishability) security against a quantumadversaryR and
semantic security against a quantum adversary S. We define both of them below.
First, we define an indistinguishability security notion against malicious R. To do that, we
employ an extraction mechanism to extract R’s input x∗1. We then argue that R should not be able
to distinguish whether S uses x02 or x
1
2 in the protocol as long as f (x∗1, x02)  f (x∗1, x12). We don’t
place any requirements on the computational complexity of the extraction mechanism.
Definition 12 (Indistinguishability Security: Malicious QuantumR). Consider a secure function eval-
uation protocol for a functionality f between a sender S and a receiver R. We say that the secure evaluation
protocol satisfies indistinguishability security against malicious R∗ if for every adversarial QPT R∗,
there is an extractorExt (not necessarily efficient) such the following holds. Consider the following experiment:
Expt(1λ , b):
• R∗ outputs the first message msg1.
• Extractor Ext on input msg1 outputs x
∗
1.
• Let x02 , x
1
2 be two inputs such that f (x∗1, x02)  f (x∗1, x12). Party S on input msg1 and xb2 , outputs the
second message msg2.
• R∗ upon receiving the second message outputs a bit out.
• Output out.
We require that, Pr[1 ← Expt(1λ , 0)] − Pr[1 ← Expt(1λ , 1)] ≤ negl(λ),
for some negligible function negl.
Wenowdefine semantic security againstS. We insist that S should not be able to distinguishwhich
input S used to compute its messages. Note that S does not get to see the output recovered by the
receiver.
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Definition 13 (Semantic Security against Quantum S∗). Consider a secure function evaluation protocol
for a functionality f between a sender S and a receiver R where R gets the output. We say that the secure
function evaluation protocol satisfies semantic security against S∗ if for every adversarial QPT S∗, the
following holds: Consider two strings x01 and x
1
2. Denote byDb the distribution of the first message (sent to
S∗) generated using xb1 as R’s input. The distributions D0 andD1 are computationally indistinguishable.
Instantiation. Asecure function evaluation protocol can be built from garbled circuits and oblivi-
ous transfer that satisfies indistinguishability security against malicious receivers. Garbled circuits
canbebasedon thehardness of learningwith errors by suitably instantiating the symmetric encryp-
tion in the construction of Yao’s garbled circuits [Yao86] with one based on the hardness of learn-
ing with errors [Reg09]. Oblivious transfer with indistinguishability security against malicious
receivers based on learning with errors was presented in a recent work of Brakerski et al. [BD18].
Thus, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 14 ([Yao86, Reg09, BD18]). Assuming the quantum hardness of learning with errors, there exists
a quantum-secure function evaluation protocol for polynomial time classical functionalities.
2.7 Lockable Obfuscation
We first recall the definition of circuit obfuscation schemes [BGI+01]. A circuit obfuscation scheme
associatedwith the class of circuits C consists of the classical PPT algorithms (Obf,ObfEval) defined
below:
• Obfuscation, Obf(1λ , C): it takes as input the security parameter λ, circuit C and produces
an obfuscated circuit C˜.
• Evaluation, ObfEval(C˜, x): it takes as input the obfuscated circuit C˜, input x and outputs y.
Perfect Correctness. A program obfuscation scheme (Obf,ObfEval) is said to be correct if for ev-
ery circuit C ∈ C with C : {0, 1}ℓin → {0, 1}ℓout , for every input x ∈ {0, 1}ℓin , we have C˜(x)  C(x).
We are interested in program obfuscation schemes that are (i) defined for a special class of circuits
called compute-and-compare circuits and, (ii) satisfy distributional virtual black box security no-
tion [BGI+01]. Such obfuscation schemes were first introduced by [WZ17, GKW17] and are called
lockable obfuscation schemes. We recall their definition, adapted to quantum security, below.
Definition 15 (Quantum-Secure Lockable Obfuscation). An obfuscation scheme (Obf,ObfEval) for a
class of circuits C is said to be a quantum-secure lockable obfuscation scheme if the following properties
are satisfied:
• It satisfies the above mentioned correctness property.
• Compute-and-compare circuits: Each circuitC inC is parameterized by strings α ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ) , β ∈
{0, 1}poly(λ) and a poly-sized circuit C such that on every input x, C(x) outputs β if and only if
C(x)  α.
16
• Security: For every polynomial-sized circuit C, string β ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ),for every QPT adversary A
there exists a QPT simulator Sim such that the following holds: sample α
$←− {0, 1}poly(λ),{
Obf
(
1λ ,C
)}
≈Q ,ε
{
Sim
(
1λ , 1|C |
)}
,
where C is a circuit parameterized by C, α, β with ε ≤ 1
2|α | .
Instantiation. The works of [WZ17, GKW17, GKVW19] construct a lockable obfuscation scheme
based on polynomial-security of learning with errors (see Section 2.1). Since learning with er-
rors is conjectured to be hard against QPT algorithms, the obfuscation schemes of [WZ17, GKW17,
GKVW19] are also secure against QPT algorithms. Thus, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 16 ([GKW17, WZ17, GKVW19]). Assuming quantum hardness of learning with errors, there
exists a quantum-secure lockable obfuscation scheme.
3 Secure Quantum Extraction Protocols
We define the notion of quantum extraction protocols below. An extraction protocol, associated
with an NP relation, is a classical interactive protocol between a sender and a receiver. The sender
has an NP instance and a witness; the receiver only has the NP instance. Roughly speaking, we
require the property that there is aQPT extractor that can extract thewitness from a semi-malicious
sender (i.e., follows the protocol but is allowed to choose its own randomness) even if the sender is a
QPT algorithm. In addition, we require the following property (zero-knowledge): the interaction
of any malicious receiver with the sender should be simulatable without the knowledge of the
witness. The malicious receiver can either be classical or quantum and thus, we have two notions
of quantum extraction protocols corresponding to both of these cases.
In terms of properties required, this notion closely resembles the concept of zero-knowledge
argument of knowledge (ZKAoK) systems. There are two important differences:
• Firstly, we do not require any completeness requirement from the underlying interactive pro-
tocol.
• In ZKAoK systems, the prover can behave maliciously (i.e., deviates from the protocol) and
the argument of knowledge property states that the probability with which the extractor can
extract is negligibly close to the probability with which the prover can convince the verifier.
In our definition, there is no guarantee of extraction if the sender behaves maliciously.
Definition 17 (Quantum extraction protocols secure against quantum adversaries). A quantum
extraction protocol secure against quantum adversaries, denoted by qQEXT is a classical protocol
between two parties, sender S and a receiver R and is associated with an NP relation R. The input to both
the parties is an instance z ∈ L(R). In addition, the sender also gets as input the witness w such that
(z,w) ∈ R. At the end of the protocol, the receiver gets the output w′. The following properties are satisfied
by qQEXT:
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• Quantum Zero-Knowledge: Let p : N → N be any polynomially bounded function. For every
(z,w) ∈ R, for any QPT algorithm R∗ with private quantum register of size |RR∗ |  p(λ), for any
large enough security parameter λ ∈ N, there exists a QPT simulator Sim such that
ViewR∗
(
〈S(1λ , z,w),R∗(1λ , z, ·)〉
)
≈Q Sim(1λ ,R∗, z, ·).
• Semi-Malicious Extractability: Let p : N → N be any polynomially bounded function. For any
large enough security parameter λ ∈ N, for every (z,w) ∈ L(R), for every QPT S∗ with private
quantum register of size |RS∗ |  p(λ), there exists a QPT extractor Ext  (Ext1 , Ext2) (possibly using
the code of S∗ in a non black box manner), the following holds:
– ViewS∗
(〈S∗(1λ , z,w, ·),R(1λ , z)〉) ≈Q Ext1 (1λ , S∗, z, ·)
– If S∗ is semi-malicious7 then the probability that Ext2 outputs w′ such that (z,w′) ∈ R is
negligibly close to 1.
Definition 18 (Quantum extraction protocols secure against classical adversaries). A quantum ex-
tractionprotocol secure against classical adversaries cQEXT is defined the sameway as inDefinition 17
except that instead of quantum zero-knowledge, cQEXT satisfies classical zero-knowledge defined below:
• Classical Zero-Knowledge: Let p : N → N be any polynomially bounded function. For any large
enough security parameter λ ∈ N, for every (z,w) ∈ R, for any classical PPT algorithm R∗ with
auxiliary information aux ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ), there exists a classical PPT simulator Sim such that
ViewR∗
(
〈S(1λ , z,w),R∗(1λ , z, aux)〉
)
≈c Sim(1λ ,R∗, z, aux).
Quantum-Lasting Security. Adesirable property of cQEXT protocols is that a classical malicious
receiver, long after the protocol has been executed cannot use a quantum computer to learn the
witness of the sender from the transcript of the protocol and its own private state. We call this
property quantum-lasting security; first introduced byUnruh [Unr13]. We formally define quantum-
lasting security below.
Definition 19 (Quantum-Lasting Security). A cQEXT protocol is said to be quantum-lasting secure
if the following holds: for any large enough security parameter λ ∈ N, for any semi-malicious classical PPT
R∗, for any QPT adversary A∗, for any auxiliary information aux ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ), for any auxiliary state of
polynomially many qubits, ρ, there exist a QPT simulator Sim∗ such that:
A∗
(
ViewR∗
〈
S(1λ , z,w),R∗(1λ , z, aux)〉 , ρ) ≈Q Sim∗(1λ , z, aux, ρ)
4 QEXT Secure Against Classical Adversaries
In this section, we show how to construct quantum extraction protocols secure against classical
adversaries. While such protocols can be constructed from assumptions such as decisional Diffie-
7A QPT algorithm is said to be semi-malicious in the quantum extraction protocol if it follows the protocol but is
allowed to choose its own randomness.
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Hellman (DDH), factoring etc., i.e., cryptographic assumptions that are broken by polynomial-
time quantum attacks8 and additionally post-quantum secure cryptographic assumptions such as
learning with errors (needed to argue quantum-lasting security), we show that rather surprisingly
such protocols can be based solely on learning with errors.
Tools.
• Quantum-secure computationally-hiding andperfectly-bindingnon-interactive commitments,
Comm (see Section 2.3).
• Noisy trapdoor claw-free functions { fk,b : X → DY}k∈K ,b∈{0,1} (see Section 2.4).
• Quantum-secure secure function evaluation protocolSFE  (SFE.S, SFE.R) (see Section 2.6).
Construction. We present the construction of the quantum extraction protocol (S,R) in Figure 1
for an NP language L. Our extraction mechanism of committing to the shares of the values and
later releasing only one of the shares is borrowed from [PW09].
Lemma 20. Assuming the quantum security of Comm, SFE and NTCFs, the protocol (S,R) is a quantum
extraction protocol secure against classical adversaries for NP.
Proof.
Classical Zero-Knowledge. Let R∗ be a classical PPT algorithm. We first describe a classical sim-
ulator Sim such that R∗ cannot distinguish whether its interacting with S or with Sim.
Description of Sim.
• Until the SFE round, it behaves as the honest sender would,
– For every i ∈ [k], it computes (ki , tdi) ← Gen(1λ ; ri). Send
({ki}i∈[k] ) .
– It receives {yi}i∈[k] from R∗.
– It sends bits (v1, . . . , vk), where vi $←− {0, 1} for i ∈ [k].
– It receives
({
c
( j)
i,0
, c
( j)
i,1
}
i, j∈[k]
)
from R∗.
– For every i , j ∈ [k], it sends random bits w( j)
i
∈ {0, 1}.
– It receives
({
(sh( j)
i,wi
)′, (d( j)
i,wi
)′
}
i, j∈[k]
)
from R∗.
• It then executesSFEwithR∗, associatedwith the two-party functionality Fdefined in Figure 1;
the input of Sim in SFE is ⊥.
8An example of such a protocol is the sender encrypts the witness using an encryption scheme, based on DDH,
factoring etc.
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FInput of sender:
({
c
( j)
i,0
, c
( j)
i,1
, (sh( j)
i,wi
)′, (d( j)
i,wi
)′, tdi , ki , yi , vi , w(J)i
}
i, j∈[k]
,w
)
Input of receiver:
({
sh
( j)
i,wi
, d
( j)
i,wi
}
i, j∈[k]
)
• If for any i , j ∈ [k], c( j)
i,wi
, Comm
(
1λ , (sh( j)
i,wi
)′; (d( j)
i,wi
)′
)
or c
( j)
i,wi
,
Comm
(
1λ , sh
( j)
i,wi
;d
( j)
i,wi
)
, output ⊥.
• For every i ∈ [k], let (xi,0 , xi,1) ← Inv(ki , tdi , yi).
– Output⊥ if the following does not hold: for every j, j′ ∈ [k], we have (sh( j)
i,wi
)′⊕
sh
( j)
i,wi
 (sh( j′)
i,wi
)′ ⊕ sh( j′)
i,wi
.
– If vi  0: let (bi , J(x′i,b i ))  (sh
( j)
i,wi
)′ ⊕ sh( j)
i,wi
, where J(·) is the injection in the
definition of NTCF. If x′
i,b i
, xi,b i , output ⊥.
– If vi  1: let (ui , di)  (sh( j)i,wi )′ ⊕ sh
( j)
i,wi
. If 〈di , J(xi,0) ⊕ J(xi,1)〉 , ui, or if
di < Gki ,0,xi ,0 ∩ Gki ,1,xi ,1 output ⊥.
• Otherwise, outputw.
Figure 1: Description of the function F associated with the SFE.
We prove the following by a sequence of hybrids. For some arbitrary auxiliary information aux ∈
{0, 1}poly(λ),
ViewR∗
(
〈S(1λ , z,w),R∗(1λ , z, aux)〉
)
≈c Sim(1λ ,R∗, z, aux),
Hyb1: The output of this hybrid is ViewR∗
(〈S(1λ , z,w),R∗(1λ , z, aux)〉) .
Hyb2: Consider the following sender, Hyb2.S, that behaves as follows:
1. R∗: Sends {yi}i∈[k].
2. Hyb2.S: Sends (v1 , . . . , vk) uniformly at random. If R∗ aborts in this step, Hyb2.S aborts.
3. R∗: Sends
{(
c
( j)
i,0
, c
( j)
i,1
)}
i, j∈[k]
. If R∗ aborts in this step, Hyb2.S aborts.
4. Hyb2.S: Sends w
( j)
i
∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random for all i , j ∈ [k].
5. R∗: Opens up the commitments queried,
{(
sh
( j)
i,wi
, d
( j)
i,wi
)}
i, j∈[k]
. IfR∗ aborts in this step,Hyb2.S
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Input of sender: (z,w).
Input of receiver: z
• S: Compute ∀i ∈ [k], (ki , tdi) ← Gen(1λ ; ri), where k  λ. Send
({ki}i∈[k] ) .
• R: For every i ∈ [k], choose a random bit bi ∈ {0, 1} and sample a random yi ←
f ′
ki ,b i
(xi,b i ), where xi,b i
$←− X. Send {yi}i∈[k]. (Recall that f ′k,b(x) is a distribution overY.)
• S: Send bits (v1 , . . . , vk), where vi $←− {0, 1} for i ∈ [k].
• R: For every i , j ∈ [k], compute c( j)
i,0
← Comm(1λ , sh( j)
i,0
;d
( j)
i,0
) and c( j)
i,1
←
Comm(1λ , sh( j)
i,1
;d
( j)
i,1
), where sh( j)
i,0
, sh
( j)
i,1
$←− {0, 1}poly(λ) for i , j ∈ [k]. Send({
c
( j)
i,0
, c
( j)
i,1
}
i, j∈[k]
)
.
• S: For every i , j ∈ [k], send random bits w( j)
i
∈ {0, 1}.
• R: Send
({
(sh( j)
i,wi
)′, (d( j)
i,wi
)′
}
i, j∈[k]
)
.
• S and R run SFE, associated with the two-party functionality F defined in Fig-
ure 1; S takes the role of SFE.S and R takes the role of SFE.R. The input to SFE.S
is
({
c
( j)
i,0
, c
( j)
i,1
, (sh( j)
i,wi
)′, (d( j)
i,wi
)′, tdi , ki , yi , vi , w(J)i
}
i, j∈[k]
,w
)
and the input to SFE.R is({
sh
( j)
i,wi
, d
( j)
i,wi
}
i, j∈[k]
)
.
Figure 2: Quantum Extraction Protocol (S,R)
aborts. If c
( j)
i,wi
, Comm(1λ , sh( j)
i,wi
;d
( j)
i,wi
) for any i , j ∈ [k], continue the execution of the proto-
col as in Step 11.
6. Hyb2.S: Keep rewinding (poly(k) times) to Step 4, until it is able to recover another commit-
ment accepting transcript. A commitment accepting transcript is one for which all the com-
mitments opened in Step 5 are valid, i.e. that c
( j)
i,wi
 Comm(1λ , sh( j)
i,wi
;d
( j)
i,wi
). Let {(w( j)
i
)′} be
the queries sent in the second recovered commitment accepting transcript. If for any i ∈ [k],
it is the case that for every j ∈ [k], it holds that (w( j)
i
)′  w( j)
i
, then abort.
7. If Hyb2.S did not abort in the previous step, then for every i ∈ [k], there is ji ∈ [k], s.t.
(w( ji)
i
)′ , w( ji)
i
. From these two transcripts, it extracts the committed value.
8. Hyb2.S: (We call this step the NTCF condition check). From the commited values recovered,
check if they satisfy the desired NTCF conditions. I.e. for every i ∈ [k], if vi  0, check if
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the decommited value if a valid preimage (bi , J(xi,b i )), and if vi  1 check if the decommited
value is a valid correlation (ui , di). If the check do not pass, continue as before. If the check
pass,
• Keep rewinding (poly(k) times) until Step 2, repeating the proccess above, including the
rewinding phase for the commitment challenges. The rewinding continues until we get
another transcript, for which the NTCF check passes. Let (v′1 , . . . , v′k) be the messages
sent at Step 2 in the new transcript.
9. Hyb2.S: If (v1 , . . . , vk) and (v′1 , . . . , v′k) are different in less than ω(log(k)) coordinates, then
abort.
10. If Hyb2.S has not aborted so far, let S be the set of indices at which both (v1, . . . , vk) and
(v′1 , . . . , v′k) differ. For i ∈ S, let (bi , xi) and (di , ui) be the values recovered from the commit-
ment accepting transcripts associated with bits vi and v
′
i
. Denote T  {(bi , xi , di , ui) : i ∈ S}.
Moreover, |T |  ω(log(k))
11. Now, continue the execution of the protocol on the original thread; i.e., when the Hyb2.S
queries (w1, . . . , wk) and (v1 , . . . , vk).
The only difference between Hyb1 and Hyb2 is that Hyb2.S aborts on some transcripts; condi-
tioned on Hyb2.S not aborting, the transcript produced by the receiver when interacting with S is
identical to the transcript produced by Hyb2.S. We claim that the probability that Hyb2.S aborts,
conditioned on the event that R∗ does not abort, is negligibly small.
Claim 21. Pr[Hyb2.S aborts|R∗ does not abort]  negl(k)
Proof. To argue this, we first establish some terminology. Let p1 be the probability with which R
∗
produces a commitment accepting transcript and p2 be the probability with which R
∗ passes the
NTCF condition check. We call the rewinding performed in Step 4 to be "inner rewinding" and the
the rewinding performed in Step 8 to be "outer rewinding".
In the rest of the proof, we condition on the event thatR∗ does not abort. Consider the following
claims.
Claim 22. The probability that the number of outer rewinding operations performed is greater than k is
negligible.
Proof. Note that the outer rewinding is performed till the point it can recover a transcript that passes
the NTCF check. Since the probability that R∗ produces a transcript that passes the NTCF check is
p2, we have that the expected number of outer rewinding operations to be (1 − p2) + p2 · 1p2 ≤ 2.
By Chernoff, the probability that the number of outer rewinding operations is greater than k is
negligible. 
Claim 23. The probability that the number of inner rewinding operations performed is greater than k2 is
negligible.
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Proof. Note that for every NTCF transcript, Comm is rewoundmany times until Hyb2.S can indeed
recover another commitment-accepting transcript. For a given NTCF transcript, since the proba-
bility that R∗ produces a commitment accepting transcript is p1, we have that the expected number
of inner rewinding operations to be (1 − p1) + p1 · 1p1 ≤ 2. And thus by Chernoff, for a given NTCF
transcript, the probability that the number of inner rewinding operations is greater than k is neg-
ligible. Since the number NTCF transcripts produced is at most k with probability negligibly close
to 1, we have that the total number of inner rewinding operations is at most k2 with probability
neglibly close to 1. 
We now argue about the probability that Hyb2.S aborts on an NTCF transcript (Step 9) and the
probability that it aborts on the transcript of Comm (Step 6).
Claim 24. The probability that Hyb2.S aborts in Step 9 is negligible.
Proof. Note that Hyb2.S aborts in Step 9 only if: (i) it received a valid transcript on the original
thread of execution, (ii) it rewinds until the point it receives another valid NTCF transcript and,
(iii) the challenge (v′1 , . . . , v′k) on which the second transcript was accepted differs from (v1 , . . . , vk)
only in ω(log(k)) co-ordinates. Thus, the probability that it aborts is the following quantity:
p2(p2 + p2(1 − p2) + p2(1 − p2)2 + · · · ) · Pr[ (v1 ,...,vk) and (v
′
1
,...,v′
k
)
differ in less than ω(log(k)) co-ordinates]
≤ p22
(
1
p2
)
· Pr[ (v1 ,...,vk) and (v′1 ,...,v′k)
differ in less than ω(log(k)) co-ordinates]
 p2 · negl(k) (By Chernoff Bound)

Claim 25. The probability that Hyb2.S aborts in Step 6 is negligible.
Proof. Since step 6 is executed formultipleNTCF transcripts, we need to argue that for any ofNTCF
transcripts, the probability that Hyb2.S aborts in Step 6 is negligible. Since we already argued in
Claim 23 that the number of inner rewinding operations is poly(k), by union bound, it suffices to
argue the probability that for any given NTCF transcript, the probability that Hyb2.S aborts in Step
6 is negligible. This is similar to the argument in Claim 24: the probability that Hyb2.S aborts in
Step 6 is p2
1
· 1p1 · Pr
[
∃i ∈ [k], ∀ j ∈ [k] :
(
w
( j)
i
)′

(
w
( j)
i
)]
 p1 · 2−k . 
Observe that Hyb2.S only aborts in Steps 6 and 9; recall that we have already conditioned on the
even that R∗ does not abort. Thus, we have the proof of the claim.

This claim shows that Hyb1 and Hyb2 are indistinguishable:
ViewR∗
(
〈S(1λ , z,w),R∗(1λ , z, aux)〉
)
≈c ViewR∗
(
〈Hyb2.S(1λ , z,w),R∗(1λ , z, aux)〉
)
.
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Hyb3: In this hybrid, Hyb3.S will do as Hyb2.S except as follows: once it gets to step 8, if the NTCF
check passes, it continues as usual, but if the NTCF check does not pass, it inputs ⊥ in the SFE.
The indistinguishability of Hyb3 and Hyb4 follows from the security of the SFE against malicious
receivers, and we have:
ViewR∗
(
〈Hyb2.S(1λ , z,w),R∗(1λ , z, aux)〉
)
≈c ViewR∗
(
〈Hyb3.S(1λ , z,w),R∗(1λ , z, aux)〉
)
,
This is because the following holds in the event that the above check does not pass:
F
(({
c
( j)
i ,0
, c
( j)
i ,1
, (sh( j)
i ,wi
)′, (d( j)
i ,wi
)′, tdi , ki , yi , vi , w( j)i
}
i , j∈[k]
,w
)
,
({
sh
( j)
i ,wi
, d
( j)
i ,wi
}
i , j∈[k]
))
 F
(
(⊥) ,
({
sh
( j)
i ,wi
, d
( j)
i ,wi
}
i , j∈[k]
))
.
Hyb4: In this hybrid, Hyb4.S always inputs ⊥ in the SFE.
We have the following:
ViewR∗
(
〈Hyb3.S(1λ , z,w),R∗(1λ , z, aux)〉
)
≈c ViewR∗
(
〈Hyb4.S(1λ , z,w),R∗(1λ , z, aux)〉
)
This is because either Hyb3.S inputs ⊥ into the SFE or it can find T  {(bi , xi , ui , di) : i ∈ S} (see
Hyb2) such that both (bi , xi) and (ui , di) pass the NTCF checks corresponding to the i th instantia-
tion. Moreover, recall that |T |  ω(log(k)). This contradicts the security of NTCFs: by the adaptive
hardcore bit property of the NTCF, a PPT classical adversary can break a given instantiation with
probability negligibly close to 1/2 and thus, it can break ω(log(k)) instantiations only with negli-
gible probability.
Hyb5: Now the hybrid sender, Hyb5.S does as Hyb4.S, but it does not rewind R
∗.
The statistical distance between Hyb4 and Hyb5 is negligible in k; this follows from Claim 21.
Extractability. Let S∗ be the semi-malicious sender. We define our quantum extractor Ext as fol-
lows.
Description of Ext. The input to Ext is the instance z.
• Run S∗ to obtain {ki}i∈[k] .
• For all i ∈ [k],
– Prepare the superpostion
1√
2|X|
∑
b ,x∈X ,y∈Y
√
f ′
ki ,b
(x)(y)|b , x , y〉
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which can be done efficiently by the required properties of NTCF.
– Measure the y register, to obtain outcome yi . Denote the postmeasurement quantum
state by |Ψi〉. By NTCF,
|Ψi〉 
|0, xi,0〉 + |1, xi,1〉√
2
where (xi,0 , xi,1) ← Inv(ki , tdi , yi).
– Compute J into a new register, |b , x , 0〉 → |b , x , J(x)〉, and then uncompute the register
containing x by performing J−1, i.e. |b , x , J(x)〉 → |b , x ⊕ J−1(J(x)), J(x)〉. The resulting
transformation is |b , x , 0〉 → |b , 0, J(x)〉.
– Discard the second register, and keep the first register containing b and the third register
with J(x). At this point, the extractor has the states
|Ψ′i〉 
|0, J(xi,0)〉 + |1, J(xi,1)〉√
2
• Send {yi}i∈[k] to S∗, and let {vi}i∈[k] be the message received from S∗.
• For all i ∈ [k]:
– if vi  0, measure |Ψ′i〉 in the standard basis, to obtain (bi , J(xi,b i )).
– if vi  1, apply the Hadamard transformation to |Ψ′i〉, and measure in standard basis to
obtain (ui , di)
• For all i , j ∈ [k], choose the shares (sh( j)
i,0
, sh
( j)
i,1
) uniformly at random conditioned on either
(bi , J(xi,b i ))  sh( j)i,0 ⊕ sh
( j)
i,1
or (ui , di)  sh( j)i,0 ⊕ sh
( j)
i,1
if vi  0 or vi  1 respectively.
• Perform the rest of the protocol as the honest receiver would. Output the outcome of the SFE
protocol.
Claim 26. Assuming NTCFs, perfect correctness and security of SFE, the probability that Ext extracts from
the semi-malicious sender ie negligibly close to 1.
Proof. We first claim that with probability negligibly close to 1, the following is satisfied for every
vi ∈ [k]:
• If vi  0, let (bi , J(xi,b i )) be the value obtained by measuring |Ψ′i〉 in the standard basis. Then,
f ′
ki ,b i
(xi,b)  yi,
• If vi  1, let (ui , di) be the value obtained by applying the Hadamard transformation to |Ψ′i〉,
and measuring it in the standard basis. Then 〈di , J(xi,0) ⊕ J(xi,1)〉  ui and di < Gki ,0,xi ,0 ∩
Gki ,1,xi ,1 .
This follows from the union bound and Lemma 5.1 of the protocol of [BCM+18]. By perfect cor-
rectness of SFE, it follows that if the extractor inputs shares sh
( j)
i,0
, sh
( j)
i,1
that answer correctly each
challenge, the output it will receive from the SFE will be the witnessw.

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Claim 27. ViewS∗
(〈S∗(1λ , z,w, ·),R(1λ , z)〉) ≈Q Ext1 (1λ , S∗, z, ·)
Proof. Consider the following hybrids.
Hyb1: The output of this hybrid is ViewS∗
(〈S∗(1λ , z,w, ·),R(1λ , z)〉) .
Hyb2: We define a hybrid receiver Hyb2.Rwho sets the input to SFE to be ⊥.
The following holds from the semantic security of SFE against QPT senders:
ViewS∗
(
〈S∗(1λ , z,w, ·),R(1λ , z)〉
)
≈Q ViewS∗
(
〈S∗(1λ , z,w, ·),Hyb2.R(1λ , z)〉
)
Hyb3: We define a hybrid receiver Hyb3.R that behaves as Hyb2.R, but it samples {yi}i∈[k] as the
extractor would, by preparing the claw-free superpositions, and then measuring the y register.
We claim that the distribution over yi’s is the same in Hyb2 and Hyb3. To see this, note that Hyb3
samples from the distribution yi from the distribution:
1
2|X|
∑
b∈{0,1},x∈X
f ′
ki ,b
(x)(y). To sample from
this distribution, we can first sample b ∈ {0, 1}, then an xi,b ∈ X and then sampling yi from the
distribution f ′
ki ,b
(xi,b).
Hyb4: We define a hybrid receiver Hyb4.R who computes {yi}i∈[k] by performing the quantum
operations that the extractor does, and then computes, for all i ∈ [k], either (bi , J(xi,b i )) or (ui , di)
according towhether vi  0 or vi  1 respectively. In otherwords,Hyb4.R compute correct answers
to the test of quantumness, then it commits to appropriate shares,
sh
( j)
i,0
⊕ sh( j)
i,1

{
(bi , J(xi,b)) if vi  0
(ui , di) if vi  1
Hyb4.Ruses these shares for commitment c
( j)
i,0
 Comm(1λ , sh( j)
i,0
;d
( j)
i,0
) and c( j)
i,1
 Comm(1λ , sh( j)
i,1
;d
( j)
i,1
)
The rest of the steps are the same as Hyb3.R.
The following holds from the computational hiding property of Comm by a similar argument
to the one in [PW09]:
ViewS∗
(
〈S∗(1λ , z,w, ·),Hyb3.R(1λ , z)〉
)
≈Q ViewS∗
(
〈S∗(1λ , z,w, ·),Hyb4.R(1λ , z)〉
)
Hyb5: We define a hybrid receiverHyb5.Rwho sets the input inSFE to be
({
sh
( j)
i,wi
, d
( j)
i,wi
}
i∈[k]
)
, where
{wi}i∈[k] are the bit queried by S∗ when asking the receiver to reveal commitments. Note that the
output distribution of Hyb5.R is identical to that of the extractor Ext.
The following holds from the semantic security of SFE against quantum senders:
ViewS∗
(
〈S∗(1λ , z,w, ·),Hyb4.R(1λ , z)〉
)
≈Q ViewS∗
(
〈S∗(1λ , z,w, ·),Hyb5.R(1λ , z)〉
)
≡ Ext1
(
1λ , S∗ , z, ·
)

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Handling Aborting Adversaries. We observe that we can show our construction to satisfy a
stronger extractability property: the semi-malicious sender cannot distinguishwhether its interact-
ing with the extractor or the honest receiver even if it is allowed to abort. If at any point in time, the
sender aborts, so does the extractor and note that from the same arguments as above, the view of
the sender when interacting with the honest sender will still be indistinguishable (against a quan-
tum polynomial time adversary) from the view of the sender when interacting with the extractor.
We formalize this in the claim below.
Claim 28. The quantum extraction protocol (S, R) described in Figure 2 satisfies extractability even when
the semi-malicious sender is allowed to abort at any point during the execution of the protocol.
4.1 Application: Classical ZK arguments secure against quantum verifiers
In this section, we show how to construct a quantum zero-knowledge, classical prover, argument
system for NP secure against quantum verifiers; that is, the protocol is classical, the malicious
prover is also a classical adversary but the malicious verifier can be a polynomial time quantum
algorithm. To formally define this notion, consider the following definition.
Definition 29 (Classical arguments for NP). A classical interactive protocol (Prover, Verifier) is a clas-
sical ZK argument system for an NP language L, associated with an NP relation L(R), if the following
holds:
• Completeness: For any (z,w) ∈ L(R), we have that Pr[〈Prover(1λ , z,w), Verifier(1λ , z)〉  1] ≥
1 − negl(λ), for some negligible function negl.
• Soundness: For any z < L, anyPPT classical adversary Prover∗, and any polynomial-sized auxiliary
information aux, we have that Pr[〈Prover∗(1λ , z, aux), Verifier(1λ , z)〉  1] ≤ negl(λ), for some
negligible function negl.
We say that a classical argument system for NP is a QZK (quantum zero-knowledge) classical ar-
gument system forNP if in addition to the above properties, a classical interactive protocol satisfies
zero-knowledge against malicious receivers.
Definition30 (QZKclassical argument system forNP). Aclassical interactive protocol (Prover , Verifier)
is a quantum zero-knowledge classical argument system for a language L, associated with an NP
relation L(R) if both of the following hold.
• (Prover, Verifier) is a classical argument for L (Definition 29).
• Quantum Zero-Knowledge: Let p : N → N be any polynomially bounded function. For any
QPT Verifier∗ that on instance z ∈ L has private register of size |RVerifier∗ |  p(|z|), there exist a
QPT Sim such that the following two collections of quantum channels are quantum computationally
indistinguishable,
– {Sim(z, Verifier∗ , ·)}z∈L
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– {ViewVerifier∗(〈Prover(z, aux1), Verifier∗(z, ·)〉)}z∈L .
In other words, that for every z ∈ L, for any bounded polynomial q : N → N, for any QPT distin-
guisher D that outputs a single bit, and any p(|z|) + q(|z|)-qubits quantum state ρ,Pr [D (Sim(z, Verifier∗ , ·) ⊗ I)(ρ))  1]
−Pr [D ((ViewVerifier∗(〈Prover(z, aux1), Verifier∗(z, ·)〉) ⊗ I)(ρ))  1]  ≤ ǫ(|z|)
Witness-Indistinguishability againstquantumverifiers. Wealso considerwitness indistinguish-
able (WI) argument systems for NP languages secure against quantum verifiers. We define this
formally below.
Definition 31 (Quantum WI for an L ∈ NP). A classical protocol (Prover, Verifier) is a quantum wit-
ness indistinguishable argument system for an NP language L if both of the following hold.
• (Prover, Verifier) is a classical argument for L (Definition 29).
• QuantumWI: Let p : N→ N be any polynomially bounded function. For every z ∈ L, for any two
valid witnesses w1 and w2, for any QPT Verifier
∗ that on instance z has private quantum register of
size |RVerifier∗ |  p(|z|), we require that
ViewVerifier∗(〈Prover(z,w1), Verifier∗(z, ·)〉) ≈Q ViewVerifier∗(〈Prover(z,w2), Verifier∗(z, ·)〉).
If (Prover, Verifier) is a quantumproof system (sound against unbounded provers), we say that (Prover, Verifier)
is a quantum witness indistinguishable proof system for L.
Instantiation. By suitably instantiating the constant roundWI argument system of Blum [Blu86]
with perfectly binding quantum computational hiding commitments, we achieve a constant round
quantumWI classical argument system assuming quantum hardness of learning with errors.
4.1.1 Construction
We present a construction of constant round quantum zero-knowledge classical argument system
for NP.
Tools.
• Perfectly-binding and quantum-computational hiding non-interactive commitments Comm
(see Section 2.3).
• Quantum extraction protocol secure against classical adversaries cQEXT  (S,R) associated
with the relationREXT as constructed in Section 5. More generally, cQEXT could be any quan-
tum extraction protocol secure against classical adversaries as long as it satisfies Claim 28.
• Quantumwitness indistinguishable classical argument of knowledge systemΠWI  (ΠWI.Prover,
ΠWI.Verifier) for the relation Rwi (Definition 31).
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Instance:
(
z, td,
{
(c( j)0 )∗ , (c
( j)
1 )∗
}
j∈[k]
)
Witness:
(
w,
{
(sh( j)
0
, d
( j)
0
, sh
( j)
1
, d
( j)
1
)
}
j∈[k]
)
NP verification: Accept if one of the following two conditions are satisfied:
• (z,w) ∈ R.
• If for every j ∈ [k], it holds that(
(c( j)
0
)∗  Comm(1λ , sh( j)
0
;d
( j)
0
)
)∧ (
(c( j)
1
)∗  Comm(1λ , sh( j)
1
;d
( j)
1
)
)∧ (
td  sh
( j)
0
⊕ sh( j)
1
)
.
Figure 3: Relation Rwi associated with ΠWI.
Construction. LetL be anNP language. Wedescribe a classical interactiveprotocol (Prover, Verifier)
for L in Figure 4.
Lemma 32. The classical interactive protocol (Prover, Verifier) is a quantum zero-knowledge, classical
prover, argument system for NP.
Proof. The completeness is straightforward. We prove soundness and zero-knowledge next.
Soundness. Let Prover∗ be a classical PPT algorithm. We prove that Prover∗(1λ , z, aux), for z < L
and auxiliary information aux, can convince Verifier(1λ , z) with only negligible probability. Con-
sider the following hybrids.
Hyb1: The output of this hybrid is the viewof theproverViewProver∗(〈Prover∗(1λ , z, aux), Verifier(1λ , z)〉)
along with the decision bit of Verifier.
Hyb2: We consider the following hybrid verifier Hyb2.Verifierwhich executes the trapdoor commit-
ment phase and the trapdoor extractionphasewithProver∗ honestly. It then receives {((c( j)0 )∗ , (c
( j)
1 )∗))} j∈[k]
from theprover. Hyb2.Verifier sends randombits {b( j)} j∈[k] toProver∗ and it then receives (sh( j)b( j) , d
( j)
b( j)
).
At this point, Hyb2.Verifierwill rewind until it can extract td
∗ from the commitments; if it extracted
multiple values or it didn’t extract any value, set td∗  ⊥. This is done similarly to the cQEXT case
and the argument from [PW09].
The output distribution of this hybrid is identical to the output distribution of Hyb1.
The following holds:
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• Trapdoor Committment Phase: Verifier: sample td ← {0, 1}λ . Compute c ←
Comm(1λ , td;d), whered← {0, 1}poly(λ) is the randomness used in the commitment.
Send c to Prover.
• Trapdoor Extraction Phase: Prover and Verifier run the quantum extraction protocol
cQEXTwith Verifier taking the role of the sender cQEXT.S and Prover taking the role
of the receiver cQEXT.R. The input of cQEXT.S is (1λ , c, d; rqext) and the input of
cQEXT.R is
(
1λ , c
)
, where rqext is the randomness used by the sender in cQEXT. Let
the transcript generatedduring the execution of cQEXT beTVerifier→Prover. The trapdoor
extraction phase will be used by the simulator, while proving zero-knowledge, to extract the
trapdoor from the malicious verifier.
• Let k  λ. For every j ∈ [k], Prover sends (c( j)0 )∗  Comm(1λ , sh
( j)
0 ;d
( j)
0 ) and (c
( j)
1 )∗ 
Comm(1λ , sh( j)
1
;d
( j)
1
), where sh( j)
0
, sh
( j)
1
$←− {0, 1}poly(λ).
• For every j ∈ [k], Verifier sends bit b( j) $←− {0, 1} to Prover.
• Prover sends (sh( j)
b( j)
, d
( j)
b( j)
) to Verifier.
• Verifier sends rqext , d, td to Prover. Then Prover checks the following:
– Let TVerifier→Prover be (mS1 , mR1 , . . . , mSt′ , mRt′), where themessage mRi (resp., mSi ) is
the message sent by the receiver (resp., sender) in the i th round 9 and t′ is the
number of rounds of cQEXT. Let the message produced by S
(
1λ , c, d; rqext
)
in
the i th round be m˜S
i
.
– If for any i ∈ [t′], m˜S
i
, mS
i
then Prover aborts If c , Comm(1λ , td;d) then abort.
• Execute QuantumWI: Prover and Verifier runΠWI with Prover taking the role ofΠWI
prover ΠWI.Prover and Verifier taking the role of ΠWI verifier ΠWI.Verifier. The input
to ΠWI.Prover is the security parameter 1
λ , instance
(
z, td,
{
(c( j)
0
)∗ , (c( j)
1
)∗
}
j∈[k]
)
and
witness (w,⊥). The input to ΠWI.Verifier is the security parameter 1λ and instance(
z, td,
{
(c( j)0 )∗ , (c
( j)
1 )∗
}
j∈[k]
)
.
• Decision step: Verifier computes the decision step of ΠWI.Verifier.
Figure 4: (Classical Prover) Quantum Zero-Knowledge Argument Systems for NP.
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Pr
[
1 ← 〈P∗(1λ , z, aux),Hyb2.Verifier(1λ , z)〉
]
 Pr
[
1←〈P∗(1λ ,z,aux),Hyb2 .Verifier(1λ ,z)〉∧
(td∗td∨ td∗,td) : td∗ ← Ext(1λ , ρaux)
]
≤ Pr
[
1←〈P∗(1λ ,z,aux),Hyb2 .Verifier(1λ ,z)〉∧
(td∗td)
: td∗ ← Ext(1λ , ρaux)
]
︸¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨︷︷¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨︸
ε1
+Pr
[
1←〈P∗(1λ ,z,aux),Hyb2 .Verifier(1λ ,z)〉∧
(td∗,td)
: td∗ ← Ext(1λ , ρaux)
]
︸¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨︷︷¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨¨ ¨︸
ε2
We prove the following claims.
Claim 33. ε1 ≤ negl(λ), for some negligible function negl.
Proof. Consider the following hybrids.
Hyb3: We define a hybrid verifier Hyb3.Verifier that performs the trapdoor commitment phase hon-
estly. In the trapdoor extraction phase, it executes QEXT1.Sim(1λ), instead of QEXT1.S(1λ , c, d),
while interacting with Prover∗. The rest of the steps of Hyb3.Verifier is as defined in Hyb2.Verifier.
Let td∗ be the trapdoor extracted as before. From the zero-knowledge property of cQEXT, the
following holds:
ε1 ≤ Pr
[
1←〈P∗(1λ ,z,aux),Hyb3.Verifier(1λ ,z)〉∧
(td∗td)
: td∗ ← Ext(1λ , ρaux)
]
+ negl(λ) (1)
Hyb4: We define the hybrid verifierHyb4.Verifier that performs the same steps asHyb3.Verifier execpt
that it computes c as Comm(1λ , 0; d) instead of Comm(1λ , td; d), where 0 is a λ-length string of all
zeroes.
Let td∗ be the trapdoor extracted as before. From the quantum hiding property of Comm, the
following holds:
Pr
[
1←〈P∗(1λ ,z,aux),Hyb3.Verifier(1λ ,z)〉∧
(td∗td)
: td∗ ← Ext(1λ , ρaux)
]
(2)
≤ Pr
[
1←〈P∗(1λ ,z,aux),Hyb4.Verifier(1λ ,z)〉∧
(td∗td)
: td∗ ← Ext(1λ , ρaux)
]
+ negl(λ) (3)
Hyb5: We define the hybrid verifierHyb5.Verifier that performs the same steps asHyb4.Verifier except
that it samples td after it completes its interaction with the Prover∗.
Note that the output distributions of Hyb4 and Hyb5 are identical. Moreover, the probability
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that Hyb5.Verifier accepts and td
∗
 td is at most 1
2λ
. Thus we have,
Pr
[
1←〈P∗(1λ ,z,aux),Hyb4 .Verifier(1λ ,z)〉∧
(td∗td)
: td∗ ← Ext(1λ , ρaux)
]
 Pr
[
1←〈P∗(1λ ,z,aux),Hyb5 .Verifier(1λ ,z)〉∧
(td∗td)
: td∗ ← Ext(1λ , ρaux)
]
≤ negl(λ)
From the above hybrids, it follows that ε1 ≤ negl(λ).

Claim 34. ε2 ≤ negl(λ), for some negligible function negl.
Proof. Since the trapdoor td∗ extracted from Prover∗ is not equal to td, this means that there is a
j ∈ [k] s.t. sh( j)0 ⊕ sh
( j)
1 , td, where sh
( j)
0 and sh
( j)
1 are the values committed to in (c
( j)
0 )∗ and (c
( j)
1 )∗
respectively. Moreover, from the perfect binding property of Comm, there does not exist shares
(sh( j)0 )′, (sh
( j)
1 )′ such that (sh
( j)
0 )′ , sh
( j)
0 or (sh
( j)
1 )′ , sh
( j)
1 such that the commitments of (sh
( j)
0 )′ and
(sh( j)1 )′, for some fixed random strings, are (c
( j)
0 )∗ and (c
( j)
1 )∗ respectively. 
Zero-Knowledge. Let Verifier∗ be the malicious QPT verifier. We describe the simulator Sim as
follows.
• It receives c from Verifier∗.
• Suppose Ext be the extractor of cQEXT associated with cQEXT.S∗, where cQEXT.S∗ is the
adversarial sender algorithm computed by Verifier∗. Compute Ext(1λ , cQEXT.S∗ , ·) to obtain
td∗. At any time, if Verifier∗ aborts, Sim also aborts with the output, the current private state
of Verifier∗.
• For every j ∈ [k], it samples sh( j)0 , sh
( j)
1 uniformly at random subject to sh
( j)
0 ⊕ sh
( j)
1  td
∗.
It then computes (c( j)0 )∗  Comm(1λ , sh
( j)
0 ; d
( j)
0 ) and (c
( j)
1 )∗  Comm(1λ , sh
( j)
1 ; d
( j)
1 ) and sends
((c( j)0 )∗ , (c
( j)
1 )∗) to Verifier∗.
• It receives bits {b( j)} j∈[k] from Verifier∗.
• It sends (sh( j)
b( j)
, d
( j)
b( j)
) from Verifier∗.
• It receives (rqext , d, td) from Verifier∗. It then checks the following:
– Let TVerifier→Prover be (mS1 , mR1 , . . . , mSt′ , mRt′), where themessage mRi (resp., mSi ) is themes-
sage sent by the receiver (resp., sender) in the i th round10 and t′ is the number of rounds
of cQEXT. Let the message produced by cQEXT.S
(
1λ , c, d; rqext
)
in the i th round be m˜S
i
.
– If for any i ∈ [t′], m˜S
i
, mS
i
then Sim aborts. If td , td∗ then Sim aborts.
10We remind the reader that in every round, only one party speaks.
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• Sim executesΠWI with Verifier
∗ on input instance
(
z, td,
{
(c( j)
0
)∗ , (c( j)
1
)∗
}
j∈[k]
)
. The witness Sim
uses inΠWI is
(
⊥,
{
(sh( j)
0
, d
( j)
0
, sh
( j)
1
, d
( j)
1
)
}
j∈[k]
)
. If Verifier aborts at any point in time, Sim also
aborts and outputs the current state of the verifier.
• Otherwise, output the current state of the verifier.
Weprove the indistinguishability of the viewof the verifierwhen interactingwith the honestprover
versus the view of the verifierwhen interactingwith the simulator. Consider the following hybrids.
Hyb1: The output of this hybrid is the view of Verifier
∗ when interacting with Prover. That is, the
output of the hybrid is ViewVerifier∗
(〈Prover(1λ , z,w), Verifier∗(1λ , z, ·)〉) .
Hyb2: We define a hybrid proverHyb2.Prover as follows: it first receives c from Verifier
∗. It computes
Ext(1λ , cQEXT.S∗ , ·) to obtain td∗. It then sends (c( j)0 )∗ and (c
( j)
1 )∗, where (c
( j)
0 )∗ and (c
( j)
1 )∗ are com-
mitments of sh
( j)
0 , sh
( j)
1 respectively and sh
( j)
0 , sh
( j)
1 are sampled uniformly at random. It receives b
from Verifier∗. It then sends (sh( j)
b
, d
( j)
b
) to Verifier∗. It then receives (rqext , d, td) from Verifier∗. It then
checks the following:
• Let TVerifier→Prover be (mS1 , mR1 , . . . , mSt′ , mRt′), where the message mRi (resp., mSi ) is the message
sent by the receiver (resp., sender) in the i th round and t′ is the number of rounds of cQEXT.
Let the message produced by cQEXT.S
(
1λ , c, d; rqext
)
in the i th round be m˜S
i
.
• If for any i ∈ [t′], m˜S
i
, mS
i
then Sim aborts. If td , td∗ then Sim aborts.
Hyb2.Prover finally executesΠWI with Verifier
∗; it still uses w in ΠWI.
The following holds from the semi-malicious extractability property of cQEXT:
ViewVerifier∗
(
〈Prover(1λ , z,w), Verifier∗(1λ , z, ·)〉
)
≈Q ViewVerifier∗
(
Hyb2.Prover(1λ , z,w), Verifier∗(1λ , z, ·)
)
This is because either cQEXT.S∗ is not semi-malicious in which case, simulator aborts and hence,
conditioned on the event that indeed cQEXT.S∗ is semi-malicious, Ext can extract the witness with
probability negligibly close to 1. Moreover, at any point in time if cQEXT.S∗ aborts, by Claim 28,
we have that the state of Verifier∗ output by Sim is indistinguishable from the state of Verifier∗ when
interacting with the honest prover.
Hyb3: We define a hybrid prover Hyb3.Prover as follows: it behaves exactly like Hyb2.Prover except
that it computes the commitments (c( j)0 )∗ and (c
( j)
1 )∗ as commitments of sh
( j)
0 and sh
( j)
1 , where sh
( j)
0 ⊕
sh
( j)
1  td.
The following holds from the quantum-computational hiding property of Comm following the
same argument as [PW09]:
ViewVerifier∗
(
〈Hyb2.Prover(1λ , z,w), Verifier∗(1λ , z, ·)〉
)
≈Q ViewVerifier∗
(
Hyb3.Prover(1λ , z,w), Verifier∗(1λ , z, ·)
)
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Hyb4: We define a hybrid prover Hyb4.Prover as follows: it behaves exactly like Hyb3.Prover except
that it uses the witness (⊥, (sh( j)
0
, d
( j)
0
, sh
( j)
1
, d
( j)
1
)) inΠWI instead of (w,⊥). Note that the description
of Hyb4.Prover is identical to the description of Sim.
The following holds from the quantum witness indistinguishability property ofΠWI:
ViewVerifier∗
(
〈Hyb3.Prover(1λ , z,w), Verifier∗(1λ , z, ·)〉
)
≈Q ViewVerifier∗
(
Hyb4.Prover(1λ , z,w), Verifier∗(1λ , z, ·)
)
≡ Sim(1λ , z, ·)

5 QEXT Secure Against Quantum Adversaries
5.1 Construction of QEXT
We present a construction of quantum extraction protocols secure against quantum adversaries,
denoted by qQEXT. First, we describe the tools used in this construction.
Tools.
• Quantum-secure computationally-hiding andperfectly-bindingnon-interactive commitments
Comm (see Section 2.3).
• Quantum fully homomorphic encryption scheme with some desired properties, (qFHE.Gen,
qFHE.Enc, qFHE.Dec, qFHE.Eval).
– It admits homomorphic evaluation of arbitrary computations,
– It admits perfect correctness,
– The ciphertext of a classical message is also classical.
We show in Section 2.5 that there are qFHE schemes satisfying the above properties.
• Quantum-secure two-party secure computation SFE with the following properties (see Sec-
tion 2.6):
– Only one party receives the output. We designate the party receiving the output as the
receiver SFE.R and the other party to be SFE.S.
– Security against quantum passive senders.
– IND-Security against quantum malicious receivers.
• Quantum-secure lockable obfuscation LObf  (Obf,ObfEval) for C, where every circuit C,
parameterized by (r, k , SK1 ,CT∗), in C is defined in Figure 5. Note that C is a compute-and-
compare functionality (see Section 2.7).
34
CInput: CT
Hardwired values: r, k, SK1,CT
∗.
• SK′2 ← qFHE.Dec(SK1 ,CT)
• r′ ← qFHE.Dec(SK′2,CT∗)
• If r′  r, output k. Else, output ⊥.
Figure 5: Circuits used in the lockable obfuscation
f
Input of sender: (td, c, c∗
1
, . . . , c∗
ℓ
, SK2)
Input of receiver: (d, r1, . . . , rℓ)
• If
(
c ← Comm (1λ , (r1, . . . , rℓ); d) ) ∧ (∀i ∈ [ℓ], c∗i ← Comm (1λ , tdi )) , output SK2.
• Otherwise, output ⊥.
Figure 6: Description of the function f associated with the SFE.
Construction. We construct a protocol (S,R) in Figure 7 for a NP language L, and the following
lemma shows that (S,R) is a quantum extraction protocol.
Lemma 35. Assuming the quantum security of Comm, SFE, qFHE and (S,R) is a quantum extraction
protocol for L secure against quantum adversaries.
Proof.
Quantum Zero-Knowledge. Let (z,w) ∈ R, and let R∗ be a QPT malicious receiver. Associated
with R∗ is the QPT algorithm Sim – in fact, Sim is a classical PPT algorithm that only uses R∗ as a
black-box – defined below.
Description of Sim.
• It first receives c from R∗. It performs the following operations:
– Compute the qFHE.Setup to obtain (PK1, SK1).
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Input of sender: (z,w).
Input of receiver: z
• R: sample (r1 , . . . , rℓ) $←− {0, 1}ℓ·poly(λ). Compute c ← Comm
(
1λ , (r1, . . . , rℓ ; d)
)
,
where ℓ  λ and d is the randomness used to compute c. Send c to S.
• S:
– Compute the qFHE.Setup twice; (PKi , SKi) ← qFHE.Setup(1λ) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
– Compute CT1 ← qFHE.Enc(PK1, (td| |w)), where td $←− {0, 1}λ .
– Compute C˜ ← Obf(1λ ,C[r, k, SK1,CT∗]), where r $←− {0, 1}λ and k $←− {0, 1}λ ,
CT∗ is defined below and C[r, k, SK1,CT∗] is defined in Figure 5.
∗ CT∗ ← qFHE.Enc (PK2, r)
Send msg1 
(
CT1 , C˜, otp : k ⊕ SK1
)
.
• R: compute c∗
i
← Comm (1λ , 0; ri ) for i ∈ [ℓ]. Send (c∗1 , . . . , c∗ℓ) to S.
• S and R run SFE, associated with the two-party functionality f defined in Figure 6;
S takes the role of SFE.S and R takes the role of SFE.R. The input to SFE.S is
(td, c, c∗1, . . . , c∗ℓ , SK2) and the input to SFE.R is (d, r1, . . . , rℓ).
Figure 7: Quantum Extraction Protocol (S,R)
– Compute CT1 ← qFHE.Enc(PK1,⊥).
– Compute the obfuscated circuit C˜ ← LObf.Sim (1λ , 1|C|) .
– Sample otp
$←− {0, 1} |SK1 |.
Send (CT1, C˜, otp).
• It then receives (c∗1 , . . . , c∗ℓ) from the receiver.
• It executes SFE with R∗; Sim takes the role of SFE.S with the input ⊥.
• Finally, it outputs the final state of R∗.
We show below that the view of R∗ when interacting with the honest sender is indistinguishable,
by a QPT distinguisher, from the output of Sim. Consider the following hybrids:
Hyb1: In this hybrid, R
∗ is interacting with the honest sender S. The output of this hybrid is the
output of R∗.
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Hyb2: In this hybrid, we define a hybrid sender, denoted by Hyb2.S: it behaves exactly like S except
that in SFE, the input of SFE.S is ⊥.
Consider the following claim.
Claim 36. ViewR∗
(〈S(1λ , z,w),R∗(1λ , z, ·)〉) ≈Q ViewR∗ (〈Hyb2.S(1λ , z,w),R∗(1λ , z, ·)〉) .
Proof. To prove this claim, we first need to show that the probability that the receiver R∗ commits
to w is negligible. Consider the following claim.
Claim 37. Assuming the quantum security of Comm, LObf and qFHE, the following holds:
Pr

∃r1 ,...,rℓ ,d,
(cComm(1λ ,(r1 ,...,rℓ);d))∧
(∀i∈[ℓ],c∗iComm(1λ ,tdi ;ri))1
:
c←R∗(1λ ,z,·)
td
$←−{0,1}λ
(PKi ,SKi)←qFHE.Setup(1λ),∀i∈{1,2}
CT1←qFHE.Enc(PK1 ,(td| |w))
r
$←−{0,1}λ
k
$←−{0,1} |SK1 |
CT∗←qFHE.Enc(PK2 ,r)
C˜←Obf(1λ ,C[r,k,SK1 ,CT∗])
otpk⊕SK1
(c∗1 ,...,c∗ℓ)←R∗(1λ ,z,·)

≤ negl(λ),
for some negligible function negl.
Proof. We define the event BAD1 as follows:
BAD1  1 if there exists r1 , . . . , rℓ , d such that(
c  Comm
(
1λ , (r1, . . . , rℓ); d
))∧ (
∀i ∈ [ℓ], c∗i  Comm
(
1λ , tdi; ri
))
 1,
where:
• c ← R∗(1λ , z, ·),
• CT1 ← qFHE.Enc(PK1 , (td| |w)), where (PKi , SKi) ← qFHE.Setup(1λ), ∀i ∈ {1, 2}
and td
$←− {0, 1}λ ,
• C˜ ← Obf(1λ ,C[r, k, SK1 ,CT∗]), where r $←− {0, 1}λ , k $←− {0, 1} |SK1 | and CT∗ ←
qFHE.Enc(PK2 , r),
• otp  k ⊕ SK1 and,
• R∗(1λ , z, ·) on input (CT, C˜, otp) outputs (c∗
1
, . . . , c∗
ℓ
).
Otherwise, BAD1  0.
Define p1 to be p1  Pr[BAD1  1].
We define a hybrid event BAD1.1 as follows:
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BAD1.1  1 if there exists r1 , . . . , rℓ , d such that(
c  Comm
(
1λ , (r1, . . . , rℓ); d
))∧ (
∀i ∈ [ℓ], c∗i  Comm
(
1λ , tdi; ri
))
 1,
where:
• c ← R∗(1λ , z, ·),
• CT1 ← qFHE.Enc(PK1 , (td| |w)), where (PKi , SKi) ← qFHE.Setup(1λ), ∀i ∈ {1, 2}
and td
$←− {0, 1}λ ,
• C˜ ← Obf(1λ ,C[r, k, SK1 ,CT∗]), where r $←− {0, 1}λ , k $←− {0, 1} |SK1 | and
CT∗ ← qFHE.Enc(PK2 ,⊥),
• otp  k ⊕ SK1 and,
• R∗(1λ , z, ·) on input (CT, C˜, otp) outputs (c∗1 , . . . , c∗ℓ).
Otherwise, BAD1.1  0.
We define p1.1 as p1.1  Pr[BAD1.1  1].
From the quantum security of qFHE, it holds that |p1 − p1.1 | ≤ negl(λ) for some negligible func-
tion negl. Note that we crucially rely on the fact that SFE, that requires the sender to input SK2, is
only executed after the receiver sends (c∗
1
, . . . , c∗
ℓ
).
We define a hybrid event BAD1.2 as follows:
BAD1.2  1 if there exists r1 , . . . , rℓ , d such that(
c  Comm
(
1λ , (r1, . . . , rℓ); d
))∧ (
∀i ∈ [ℓ], c∗i  Comm
(
1λ , tdi; ri
))
 1,
where:
• c ← R∗(1λ , z, ·),
• CT1 ← qFHE.Enc(PK1 , (td| |w)), where (PKi , SKi) ← qFHE.Setup(1λ), ∀i ∈ {1, 2}
and td
$←− {0, 1}λ ,
• C˜ ← LObf.Sim (1λ , 1|C|) ,
• otp  k ⊕ SK1 and,
• R∗(1λ , z, ·) on input (CT, C˜, otp) outputs (c∗1 , . . . , c∗ℓ).
Otherwise, BAD1.2  0.
We define p1.2 as p1.2  Pr[BAD1.2  1]. From the quantum security of LObf, it follows that
|p1.1 − p1.2 | ≤ negl(λ). Note that we crucially use the fact that the lock r is uniformly sampled
and independently of the function that is obfuscated.
We define a hybrid event BAD1.3 as follows:
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BAD1.3  1 if there exists r1 , . . . , rℓ , d such that(
c  Comm
(
1λ , (r1, . . . , rℓ); d
))∧ (
∀i ∈ [ℓ], c∗i  Comm
(
1λ , tdi; ri
))
 1,
where:
• c ← R∗(1λ , z, ·),
• CT1 ← qFHE.Enc(PK1 , (td| |w)), where (PKi , SKi) ← qFHE.Setup(1λ), ∀i ∈ {1, 2}
and td
$←− {0, 1}λ ,
• C˜ ← LObf.Sim (1λ , 1|C|) ,
• otp
$←− {0, 1} |SK1 | and,
• R∗(1λ , z, ·) on input (CT, C˜, otp) outputs (c∗
1
, . . . , c∗
ℓ
).
Otherwise, BAD1.3  0.
We define p1.3 as p1.3  Pr[BAD1.3  1]. Observe that p1.2  p1.3.
We define a hybrid event BAD1.4 as follows:
BAD1.4  1 if there exists r1 , . . . , rℓ , d such that(
c  Comm
(
1λ , (r1, . . . , rℓ); d
))∧ (
∀i ∈ [ℓ], c∗i  Comm
(
1λ , tdi; ri
))
 1,
where:
• c ← R∗(1λ , z, ·),
• CT1 ← qFHE.Enc(PK1,⊥), where (PKi , SKi) ← qFHE.Setup(1λ), ∀i ∈ {1, 2} and
td
$←− {0, 1}λ ,
• C˜ ← LObf.Sim (1λ , 1|C|) ,
• otp
$←− {0, 1} |SK1 | and,
• R∗(1λ , z, ·) on input (CT, C˜, otp) outputs (c∗1 , . . . , c∗ℓ).
Otherwise, BAD1.4  0.
We define p1.4 as p1.4  Pr[BAD1.4  1]. From the quantum security of qFHE, it follows that |p1.3 −
p1.4 | ≤ negl(λ). Moreover, note that p1.4  2−λ since td is information-theoretically hidden from R∗.
Thus, we have that p1 ≤ negl(λ).

We now use Claim 37 to prove Claim 36. Conditioned on BAD1 , 1, it holds that the view of R
∗
after its interaction with S is indistinguishable (by a QPT algorithm) from the view of R∗ after its
interactionwithHyb2.S; this follows from the IND-security of SFE against quantum receivers since
f ((td, c, c∗
1
, . . . , c∗
ℓ
, SK2), (d, r1, . . . , rℓ))  f ((⊥), (d, r1, . . . , rℓ)).

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Hyb3: We define a hybrid sender, denoted by Hyb3.S: it behaves exactly like Hyb2.S except that CT
∗
in C˜ is generated as CT∗ ← qFHE.Enc(PK2 ,⊥).
Assuming the quantum security of qFHE, we have:
ViewR∗
(
〈Hyb2.S(1λ , z,w),R∗(1λ , z, ·)〉
)
≈Q ViewR∗
(
〈Hyb3.S(1λ , z,w),R∗(1λ , z, ·)〉
)
Hyb4: We define a hybrid sender, denoted by Hyb4.S: it behaves exactly like Hyb3.S except that C˜
is generated as C˜ ← LObf.Sim (1λ , 1|C|) .
Assuming the quantum security of LObf, we have:
ViewR∗
(
〈Hyb3.S(1λ , z,w),R∗(1λ , z, ·)〉
)
≡ ViewR∗
(
〈Hyb4.S(1λ , z,w),R∗(1λ , z, ·)〉
)
Hyb5: We define a hybrid sender, denoted by Hyb5.S: it behaves exactly like Hyb4.S except that OT
is generated uniformly at random.
The following holds unconditionally:
ViewR∗
(
〈Hyb4.S(1λ , z,w),R∗(1λ , z, ·)〉
)
≡ ViewR∗
(
〈Hyb5.S(1λ , z,w),R∗(1λ , z, ·)〉
)
Hyb6: We define a hybrid sender, denoted by Hyb6.S: it behaves exactly like Hyb5.S except that CT1
is generated as CT1 ← qFHE.Enc(PK1,⊥).
Assuming the quantum security of qFHE, we have:
ViewR∗
(
〈Hyb5.S(1λ , z,w),R∗(1λ , z, ·)〉
)
≈Q ViewR∗
(
〈Hyb6.S(1λ , z,w),R∗(1λ , z, ·)〉
)
Since Hyb6.S is identical to Sim, the proof of quantum zero-knowledge follows.
Extractability. Let S∗  (S∗
1
, S∗
2
) be a semi-malicious QPT, where S∗
2
is the QPT involved in SFE.
Denote by R  (R1 ,R2,R3) the PPT algorithms of the honest receiver. In particular, R3 is the algo-
rithm that the receiver runs in SFE protocol. Let
ESFE(· ; d, r1, ..., rℓ , td,w, c, c∗) :
〈
R3(1λ , d, r1, . . . , rℓ), S∗2(1λ , td,w, c, c∗, ·)
〉
be the interaction channel induced on the private quantum input of S∗ by the interaction with
R in the SFE protocol for the functionality f with inputs d, r1, ..., rℓ , td,w, c, c
∗. Without loss of
generality, assume that this channel also outputs the classical message output of SFE.
Consider the following extractorExt, that takes as input the efficient quantumcircuit description
of S∗(1λ , z,w, ·), and the instance z.
Ext(1λ , S∗, z, ·):
• Run R1 to compute c, d, and r1 , . . . , rℓ .
• Apply the channel S∗
1
(1λ , z,w, c, ·).
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• Let (CT1, C˜, otp) denote the classical messages outputted by S∗1, and let ρ denote the rest of
the state.
• With CT1, homomorphically commit to td, obtaining
qFHE.Enc(PK1, c∗ : Comm(1λ , td))
.
• Encrypt (d, c, r1, . . . , rℓ), and ρ, andhomomorphically apply the channelESFE(· ; d, r1, ..., rℓ , td,w, c, c∗)
• Let qFHE.Enc(PK1, SFE.Out ⊗ ρ′) be the output of the previous step, where SFE.Out is the
classical output of the SFE protocol.
• Apply C˜ to the qFHE encryption of SFE.Out. Note that we are assuming that classical mes-
sages have classical ciphertexts, so this computation is a classical one. Let k be the output of
C˜ (qFHE.Enc(PK1 , SFE.Out)).
• Let SK1 : k ⊕ otp, and decryptCT1 with SK1. If the decryption is successful and themessage
w is recovered, let Ext2 output w.
• Use SK1 to decrypt the ciphertext qFHE.Enc(PK1 , SFE.Out ⊗ ρ′), and let Ext1 output ρ′.
Claim 38. ViewS∗
(〈S∗(1λ , z,w, ·),R(1λ , z)〉) ≈Q Ext1 (1λ , S∗ , z, ·)
Proof. Let RD be the quantum register of a distinguisher D. Let F : RD → RD be the following
channels, parametrized by d, r1, ..., rℓ , td,w, c, c
∗,
F (ρ; d, r1, ..., rℓ ,w, c, c∗) :
( [ESFE(· ; d, r1, ..., rℓ , td,w, c, c∗) ◦ S∗1(1λ , z,w, c, ·)] ⊗ Id) (ρ) .
The identity is acting on thedistinguisher’sprivate state,and the compositionESFE(· ; d, r1, ..., rℓ , td,w, c, c∗)◦
S∗
1
(1λ , z,w, c, ·) acts on the private state of S∗. We do not write td as a parameter to F , because td is
generated by S∗1 and assumed to be part of the sender’s private state. We do add it as a parameter
to ESFE to be consistent and to remind ourselves that the td is input into the SFE protocol.
Note that when d, r1, . . . , rℓ , c and c
∗ are generated by the honest R in the protocol, we have
F (ρ; d, r1, ..., rℓ ,w, c, c∗) 
(
ViewS∗
(
〈S∗(1λ , z,w, ·),R(1λ , z)〉
)
⊗ Id
)
(ρ)
Wewill show that when d, r1, . . . , rℓ , c are generated the same way as the honest Rwould gen-
erate them in the first roundR1, but the commitment c
∗
 c
∗
1 , . . . , c
∗
ℓ
is a commitment to thewitness,
w, instead, we have
F (ρ; d, r1, ..., rℓ ,w, c, c∗w) 
(
Ext1
(
1λ , S∗, z, ·
)
⊗ Id
)
(ρ)
Our goal is to show that these two cases, c∗ and c∗w, are quantum computationally indistinguishable.
To see why this last equation is true, we are using the perfect correctness of both the qFHE
scheme and of the lockable obfuscator, as well as the fact that the S∗ is semi-malicious, which
means it has to follow the protocol. This means that when S∗
1
outputs (CT1 , C˜, otp), the extractor
has avalid ciphertextCT1 encryptedwith akeyPK1, which in turn is one-timepadded,SK1⊕k  otp.
Furthermore, the one-time pad value k is the output of C˜ if an input releases the lock, and C˜ is a
correct lockable obfuscation of the desired circuit.
After this, the extractor performed ESFE(· ; d, r1, ..., rℓ , td,w, c, c∗w) homomorphically, which re-
sults in the extractor having an encryption of SK2 under PK1. This is true because the extractor is
able to commit to the witness inside the encryption, and the semi-malicious sender has to engage
correctly in the SFE. Since the extractor can now use the C˜ to obtain SK1, we can summarize the
whole operation of the extractor as follows. Let (CT1 , C˜, otp) ⊗ ρ′ be the state of the distinguisher
after S∗
1
. Then, the extractor performs
((Dec(SK1 , ·) ◦ Eval (ESFE (· ; d, r1, ..., rℓ , td,w, c, c∗w) , ·) ◦ Enc(PK1, c∗w, ·)) ⊗ Id)
(
ρ′
)
By correctness of the qFHE scheme, this is the same as the extractor performing( [ESFE(· ; d, r1, ..., rℓ , td,w, c, c∗w) ◦ S∗1(1λ , z,w, c, ·)] ⊗ Id) (ρ)
on the distinguisher’s state.
To show that the view of the sender when interacting with the honest receiver is indistinguish-
able (against polynomial time quantum algorithms) from the view of the sender when interacting
with the extractor.
Hyb1: The output of this hybrid is the view of the senderwhen interacting with the honest receiver.
Hyb2: We define a hybrid receiver Hyb2.R that behaves like the honest receiver except that the input
of Hyb2.R in SFE is ⊥. The output of this hybrid is the view of the sender when interacting with
Hyb2.R.
The quantum indistinguishability of Hyb1 and Hyb2 follows from the semantic security of SFE
against quantum polynomial time adversaries.
Hyb3: We define a hybrid receiver Hyb3.R that behaves like Hyb2.R except that it sets c to be c 
Comm(1λ , 0; d). The output of this hybrid is the view of the receiver when interacting with Hyb3.R.
The quantum indistinguishability of Hyb2 and Hyb3 follows from the quantum computational
hiding of Comm.
Hyb4: We define a hybrid receiver Hyb4.R that sets c
∗
i
 Comm(1λ , tdi ; ri), for every i ∈ [ℓ].
The quantum indistinguishability of Hyb3 and Hyb4 follows from the quantum computational
hiding of Comm.
Hyb5: We define a hybrid receiver Hyb5.R that behaves as Hyb4.R except that it sets c to be c 
Comm(1λ , (r1, . . . , rℓ); d), where ri is the randomness used in the commitment c∗i .
The quantum indistinguishability of Hyb4 and Hyb5 follows from the quantum computational
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hiding of Comm.
Hyb6: The output of this hybrid is the output of the extractor.
The quantum indistinguishability of Hyb5 and Hyb6 follows from the semantic security of SFE
against polynomial time quantum adversaries.

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